**THE STATE OF NECESSITY**

In a letter dated July 8, 1987, Archbishop Lefebvre wrote to Cardinal Ratzinger: “The permanent will to annihilate Tradition is a suicidal will, which justifies, by its very existence, true and faithful Catholics when they make the decisions necessary for the survival of the Church and the salvation of souls.”¹ In his homily on the day of the episcopal consecrations of June 30, 1988, the Archbishop returned to this rule, from which he deduced the legitimacy of his actions. “Thus,” he explained, “we find ourselves in a case of necessity.... This is why we are convinced that, by the act of these consecrations today, we are obeying...the call of God.”²

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**The Real Reason for the Society’s Stand**

The attitude of Archbishop Lefebvre and the Society of St. Pius X is not reducible to a certain personal attachment to the Church’s Tradition. If it only involved a personal attachment, we should have accepted long ago (as ultimately the priests of Campos did in 2002, and the priests of the Institute of the Good Shepherd in 2006) the principle of the personal apostolic administration or of a personal parish, which are particular, limited legal frameworks within which the expression of a personal attachment to the Tradition of the Church can legitimately prevail, more or less, according to the terms of the agreements. And because this attachment is merely personal, there is no room for challenging the gains of the Second Vatican Council to which one must willy-nilly pledge allegiance, even if it is only by signing the New Profession of Faith of 1989.³ Archbishop Lefebvre never refused in principle Rome’s extended hand, and, following its founder, the Society of St. Pius X always remains ready to respond favorably to the opportunity of these discussions with the authorities of the hierarchy. But these contacts have only one goal: to let the pure and integral voice of Catholic Tradition be heard in Rome so that it might recover its rights in the whole Church. The discussions will be in vain for as long as Rome maintains in principle the corrupted teachings of the Second Vatican Council.

Things stand thus because the liturgical and doctrinal Tradition reigning prior to Vatican II is not just one form of Catholic expression among others in the Church. It cannot be defended by pleading only the cause of “all those Catholic faithful who feel attached to some previous liturgical and disciplinary forms of the Latin tradition.”¹ The defense of this Tradition is nothing more nor less than the defense of the integrity of the Catholic Faith, which is the common good of the Church; by this very fact it entails the fight against the reforms that issued from Vatican II which challenge fundamental truths of faith and thus endanger the common good of the Church. When this common good of the Catholic Faith is considered by the authorities as the object of a simple personal attachment, a state of necessity exists.

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**The State of Necessity**

A state of necessity is an extraordinary situation in which the necessaries of natural or supernatural life are threatened in such a way that to safeguard them one finds oneself habitually obliged to break the law. Now, law is essentially intended by legislators to procure...
these necessaries to their subjects. In the Church, the whole edifice of ecclesiastical law is by definition ordered to the preaching of the doctrine of faith and the administration of the sacraments. If the application of the law goes against the end of the law intended by the legislators, it is no longer legitimate because self-contradictory. The subjects can and must take no notice of it in order to obtain the end of the law despite the authorities who apply the law contrary to the law.

It is clear that since the Second Vatican Council the Church has found herself in such a situation. The common good of the Church is the handing down of the Catholic Faith, and if the pope has received authority from Christ, it is uniquely to safeguard Tradition. Now, since the Council, instead of continuing to transmit the deposit of faith as did all their predecessors for two thousand years, the men of the Church have taken it upon themselves to impose on the faithful the principal theses of the new theology condemned by Pius XII in Humani Generis and then confirmed by Vatican Council II and the reforms that followed, novelties absolutely contrary to all that our Lord taught. Since 1965, the authorities of the Church have imposed a new Creed in three articles, with religious liberty, ecumenism, and collegiality; since 1969, they have also imposed a reformed liturgy with a new Mass of Protestant spirit and sacraments renewed in an ecumenical sense. These popes have imposed the grave errors of neomodernism, already condemned by their predecessors. Faced with this generalized protestantization, the Church must react. A state of necessity exists that legitimates resistance; it is this resistance that explains the work of Archbishop Lefebvre and the Society of Saint Pius X.

The Enduring Dilemma

Archbishop Lefebvre perceived the dilemma: either capitulate to tyranny under pretext of obedience, or else resist tyranny by rejecting false obedience.

If this government [the conciliar Church] abandons its duty and turns against the Faith, what ought we to do? Remain attached to the government, or attached to the Faith? We have a choice. Does the Faith take precedence? Or is it the government that takes precedence? We are faced with a dilemma and we are indeed obliged to make a choice.

The choice was made and the defense of the Faith prevailed over false obedience:

We do not reject the pope’s authority, but rather what he does. We do indeed recognize the pope’s authority, but when he makes use of it to do the opposite of that for which it was given him, it is obvious that we cannot follow him.

These words were spoken 20 years ago. Today, everything still hinges on this state of necessity. If one believes that it no longer exists, deeming that Pope Benedict XVI has set about correcting not only the abuses but also the false principles of the Council, it becomes necessary to cease a resistance that can no longer be justified; it becomes necessary to accept the canonical statute proposed by Rome. This is what the priests of Campos and those of the Institute of the Good Shepherd have done. But if one has kept one’s eyes open, one sees that the state of necessity still exists, and this is why the resistance must continue. Just as in June 1988 Archbishop Lefebvre would have performed “Operation Suicide” had he decided against consecrating the four bishops, so also today, obtaining a purely canonical solution for the Society of St. Pius X from Rome would be “very imprudent and hasty,” as Bishop Fellay recently reaffirmed. In fact, it is possible that circumstances have evolved on this or that point since the Roman authorities have been trying to establish a new equilibrium far removed from the shameful abuses that followed the implementation of the Council. But for all that, the circumstances have not changed fundamentally insofar as the same Roman authorities in charge of reforming abuses are still imbued with the same false principles of Vatican II, which are the ultimate source of the abuses.

This analysis, moreover, has been confirmed by the events of the last 20 years, which correspond with an aggravation of the crisis. The distance that has opened between the two liturgies amounts to an abyss separating two conceptions of the Church and the Faith. The extent of this separation can be measured by the force with which the national episcopacies oppose the initiative of the Motu Proprio Summorum Pontificum. Even if the traditional rite of the Church is not supposed to exclude the new rite, its extension is viewed badly. The same opposition was to be seen when the Vatican proposed correcting the mistranslations of “pro multis,” which is part of the words of consecration in the Mass. These two examples show that Rome is not followed when it comes to reining in abuses. On the other hand, Rome is pursuing ecumenical dialogue more than ever and continues to preach the principle of the secular State. Another very tangible result of the crisis is the steep decline in vocations in the last two decades.

A Doubly False Argumentation

In a little book published last year by Éditions Sainte Madeleine of the Monastery of Le Barroux, the Most Reverend Fernando Aréas Rífan reasons exactly as if a state of necessity not only no longer exists more than 20 years after the episcopal consecrations at Ecône, but that it never existed. The book, entitled Tradition and the Living Magisterium, is a revision of a “pastoral orientation” addressed to the priests of the St. John Vianney Apostolic Administration of Campos. It comprises three chapters. The first claims to recall the basic givens of traditional theology on the magisterium. The following two chapters apply these principles, the second to the question of the Mass, and the third...
to the teachings of the Second Vatican Council. The fundamental flaw of this reflection is twofold: it presents a warped idea of the magisterium, and it denies the state of necessity.

A False Idea of the Magisterium of the Church

Bishop Rifan has a false idea of the magisterium. The first chapter of his book Tradition and the Living Magisterium overlooks the fundamental points of the actual doctrine of the Church on the pope’s power and the Church’s magisterium [teaching authority]. Yet Bishop Antonio de Castro Mayer had underlined these points in a remarkable study published in Heri et Hodie (No.3, May 1983), the monthly periodical of the priests of Campos. This study was included in a booklet that came out in several languages, the English version being published in 2000 under the title Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman: A Summary Defense of Catholic Tradition (pages 22-23).

The Bishop Emeritus of Campos emphasized this fundamental truth: “the pope is essentially the Vicar of Jesus Christ.” From this he draws several consequences:

This aspect is of the very essence of the papacy. It cannot be put aside. Forgetting it would have the worst consequences, leading people to believe that the pope is master of the Church, that he can do what he wants, ordain and rescind according to that which might seem best to him, the faithful being always and absolutely obliged to obey him. Upon reflection, it is clear that this conception attributes to the pope omniscience and omnipotence, exclusive attributes of God. It would be idolatry, transferring to the creature that which is proper to divinity. This is why the First Vatican Council, in defining the powers of the pope, took care to also define its purpose and its limits. The pope must keep intact the Church of Christ, through which the Divine Savior perpetuates His work of salvation. Therefore he must maintain the structure of Holy Church as the Lord has constituted it, and he must vigilantly preserve and wholly transmit the faith and morality received from the Apostolic Tradition....

Should the pope be unfaithful to this mission, the grave duty of Catholics is to resist him in order to remain faithful to Jesus Christ, of whom the pope is only the vicar. …Whence it follows that the priests of Campos, in rejecting the New Mass, do not reject John Paul II, nor communion with the entire Church, since the New Mass is prejudicial to the Faith....

Contrary to these luminous considerations, Bishop Rifan preaches blind obedience to a pseudo-magisterium, to an absolute rule independent of the objective tradition of past centuries:

Being content with quoting earlier popes alone as if they were the current pope, or earlier bishops as if they were the present bishop, would be to betray the lack of a good Catholic spirit. It would be the negation of the living magisterium and the institution of a posthumous magisterium in the Protestant style.

But is he not forgetting rather quickly that the Church’s magisterium is essentially a traditional magisterium: in every age of history, the present teachings of the Catholic hierarchy always rest upon those of the past, in keeping with the words of St. Paul: “Tradidi quod et accept—I have handed down to you what I received.” The Church’s teaching is a constant teaching, for it accomplishes the integral transmission of the inalterable deposit of divine revelation. Therefore, if the faithful Catholic observes a break in the Church’s preaching, this can only be because the men charged with making this teaching heard have been unfaithful to the mission received from God; the faithful must then remain as constant as divine Tradition itself and not allow themselves to be swayed by the winds of new doctrines. Acting thus, the faithful do not place themselves above the magisterium; on the contrary, they do but show their submission to the magisterium of yesterday, which is the still living, and as indefectible as divine revelation, condemnation of today’s new unfaithful pseudo-magisterium.¹²

Rejection of the Obvious

Not content with falsifying the Catholic notion of the Church’s magisterium, Bishop Rifan also denies the state of necessity, which is nonetheless a tangible reality. Anyone used to hearing Archbishop Lefebvre preach could not but be struck by an expression that recurred incessantly, every time the former Archbishop of Dakar expounded the profound reasons for the Society’s combat: “We are obliged to observe…” This is a decisive expression, for it indicates the point of departure for all of our analysis: these are facts that have no need of demonstration because they impose themselves upon the consciences of Catholics who are the least bit lucid. From the beginning of the Society’s opposition, the attitude of Churchmen, who abuse their power by imposing on Catholics the errors already condemned by the whole of the preceding magisterium, especially by Pope St. Pius X and his successors until the venerated Pope Pius XII, has been obvious. The Conciliar apostasy is a fact against which no theoretical argument can prevail. Either one sees or one does not see. Or else one no longer sees.¹³ And once one has become blind, one can no longer bear the brightness of the light: then “you’re a libertine if you have good eyes.”

Bishop Rifan denies the obvious. And the negation of the obvious is already contained in the false idea that he makes of the magisterium. If one ascribes to the magisterium the exclusive attributes of God, neither the pope nor the bishops could ever be unfaithful to their charge, not even outside the strict limits of their infallibility. The faithful will always offer to their pastors an absolute obedience. The state of necessity is by definition an impossibility. With such a postulate, the only thing left to do is to deny the fact of the crisis in

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the Church, to minimize and then reduce to nothing the serious detriment caused by the teachings and reforms of Vatican II: religious liberty, ecumenism, the new ecclesiology, and the new Mass. This is the natural bent of the Ecclesia Dei movement. Chapters 2 and 3 of Bishop Rifan’s book are a striking illustration of this.

The New Liturgy and the State of Necessity

It suffices to examine the normative text of the Novus Ordo of 1969 to realize that the liturgical reform constitutes as such and in its principles a grave detriment for the common good of the unity of faith and worship in the Church. The conclusion of the Short Critical Study of the New Order of Mass presented on September 25, 1969, to Pope Paul VI by Cardinals Ottaviani and Bacci is well known. The Novus Ordo Missae “represents, both as a whole and in its details, a striking departure from the Catholic theology of the Mass as it was formulated in Session 22 of the Council of Trent.”14 This conclusion pertains independently of the majority of the radical critiques of the Mass. As was to be expected, Bishop Rifan attempts to discern the trouble reasoning, which the attentive reader will have no lack of valid arguments he is obliged to stoop to false sophisms. Many Communists think that two and two are four. Because they are Communists, should we think that two and two do not make four? Does Bishop Rifan suspect that, among those who, like him, are attached to the traditional rite of the Mass of St. Pius V, there are a good number of “persons inclined to sedevacantism”? Does he then conclude the illegitimacy of the traditional rite? It may be that one of the principal authors of the Short Critical Study, Fr. Guérard des Lauriers, ended up in sedevacantism,15 but that was in 1977, long after the drafting and publication of the analysis of the New Mass. Should all the works of Tertullian written before the drafting and publication of the analysis of the New Mass originate with persons inclined to sedevacantism?15

An Incontestable Examination

As was to be expected, Bishop Rifan attempts to challenge the worth of the Short Critical Study; but for lack of valid arguments he is obliged to stoop to false reasoning, which the attentive reader will have no trouble discerning.

a. A simplistic amalgam

We start with the most flagrant of these untruths: the Short Critical Study is not reliable because “the majority of the radical critiques of the Novus Ordo originate with persons inclined to sedevacantism.”15 Many Communists think that two and two are four. Because they are Communists, should we think that two and two do not make four? Does Bishop Rifan suspect that, among those who, like him, are attached to the traditional rite of the Mass of St. Pius V, there are a good number of “persons inclined to sedevacantism”? Does he then conclude the illegitimacy of the traditional rite? It may be that one of the principal authors of the Short Critical Study, Fr. Guérard des Lauriers, ended up in sedevacantism,16 but that was in 1977, long after the drafting and publication of the analysis of the New Mass. Should all the works of Tertullian written before his adhesion to Montanism be put on the Index? In fact, do the priests of Campos still use the Catholic Catechism of Marriage by Fr. Barbara, a sedevacantist of the first hour like Fr. Guérard des Lauriers?

b. The apocryphal letter of Cardinal Ottaviani

The second sophism is rather sly. Bishop Rifan presents it in §8 of Chapter 2, in which he makes much ado of the famous letter of February 17, 1970, which Cardinal Ottaviani purportedly addressed to Dom Marie-Gérard Lafond, O.S.B., and in which the eminent prelate would have claimed that he never authorized anyone to publish the Short Critical Study.17 However, this letter is a forgery. In a study which is by now quite old, Jean Madiran demolished this imposture. He had only to relate a few facts of which he was the direct witness. In October 1969, Cardinal Ottaviani personally gave authorization to publish the Short Critical Study to Fr. Raymond Dulac, one of the principal collaborators of the journal Itinéraires. One month after the letter to Dom Lafond, Jean Madiran personally obtained assurance from Cardinal Ottaviani that the authorization was authentic. Until now, it has been generally granted that the objection derived from the purported Ottaviani letter to Dom Lafond was unfounded. By resorting to it anew, 35 years after Jean Madiran’s refutation, Bishop Rifan deprives the Ecclesia Dei cause of a sizable part of its credibility.

c. Bishop de Castro Mayer Reread and Corrected

Chapter 2 concludes with a §9 in which, for the purposes of his cause, Bishop Rifan quotes Bishop de Castro Mayer’s September 12, 1969, letter to Pope Paul VI. The short excerpt18 could make one believe that Dom Antonio was seeking papal indulgence just for the privilege of continuing to use the Tridentine liturgy. But when the letter is read in its entirety,19 it becomes clear that it constitutes an unflinching list of charges against the New Mass.20 Contrary to what Bishop Rifan tries to make us believe, Bishop de Castro Mayer was seeking from Paul VI permission to keep the traditional rite to the exclusion of the new. Bishop Rifan quotes a short excerpt from a second letter sent by Bishop de Castro Mayer to Pope Paul VI on January 25, 1974.21 This passage expresses a protestation of obedience towards the pope in everything that he might decide in conformity with Church Tradition. But Bishop Rifan avoids specifying the precise tenor of this letter. The letter accompanied three documented studies,22 in which the Bishop of Campos explained to the Pope the acts of the pontifical magisterium that were unacceptable: ecumenism, religious liberty, and the New Mass. The third of these studies is by the Brazilian Lawyer Xavier da Silveira; it was subsequently published under the title What Should We Think of Paul VI’s New Mass? Bishop Rifan speaks of it, but elsewhere, in order to deny him any credibility under the pretext that the author delves into the (entirely hypothetical) question of a possible heresy of the Sovereign Pontiff. Yet the letter of January 25, 1974, quoted only partially by Bishop Rifan in §9, in a passage that Bishop Rifan does not quote, unreservedly praises this study on the
New Mass, asserting that the arguments employed by Xavier da Silveira express the thought of the Bishop of Campos.23 Fourteen years later, Dom Antonio had not changed his mind, since, having resolved to go to Ecône in person to attend the episcopal consecrations of June 30, 1988, he publicly protested against “these pernicious errors of which they [the faithful] are the victims, deceived by many persons who have received the fullness of the Holy Ghost!”24

Despite Bishop Rifan’s untruths, two facts remain uncontestable: the Short Critical Study always kept its value in the eyes of Cardinal Ottaviani, and Bishop de Castro Mayer, basing himself upon this study and that of Xavier da Silveira, always contested the grounds of Paul VI’s liturgical reform.

The Illegitimacy of the New Rite

In light of these two studies, it appears clearly that the reformed new rite of Paul VI is illegitimate. Certainly, Pope Paul VI desired to impose this reform, but that is not sufficient to constitute a legitimate exercise of authority. A pope can abuse his authority, and Paul VI undoubtedly exceeded the limits of his powers by promoting a rite so far removed from the Catholic definition of the Mass. Such a rite cannot be placed on the same rank as the traditional rite of St. Pius V:

To compare the current reform to the reform, or rather, the act by which St. Pius V canonized the Latin rite of the Mass with the aim of protecting the faith against Protestant ideology is to give proof of a serious ignorance of the history both of the Council of Trent and of the Second Vatican Council and its liturgical reform. On the one hand everything was done to safeguard the traditional expression of the true faith; on the other, the ecumenical idea so attenuated this expression that doubt invaded the minds of the faithful and of priests.25

The reformed rite of Paul VI is an intruder; it is not only less good than the traditional rite, and the latter is not only preferable. The rite of Saint Pius V is good and legitimate; the rite of Paul VI is bad and illegitimate. Without affirming as much, no one can refuse in principle to celebrate the New Mass.26

Bishop Rifan’s Preferences

In favor of the traditional rite of St. Pius V, Bishop Rifan from now on professes a simple preference:

We keep the rite of Mass in its traditional form, that is to say, the ancient form of the Roman rite....We love it, we prefer it, and we keep it because it is, for us, the best liturgical expression of Eucharistic dogma and a solid spiritual nourishment. We keep it for its richness, its beauty, its elevation, its nobility and the solemnity of its ceremonies, for its sense of the sacred and reverence, for its sense of mystery, for its greater clarity and rigor in the rubrics, which represent a greater security and protection against abuses by not leaving room for the “ambiguities, liberties, creativity, adaptations, reductions, and instrumentalizations” of which Pope John Paul II complained.27

For Bishop Rifan, the traditional rite of Mass is no longer the perfect expression of the Church’s faith, in contrast with a new rite that represents a striking departure from it both as a whole and in its details. The traditional rite is the object of a personal preference for motives extrinsic to the profession of Catholic faith, which does not exclude the legitimacy and the intrinsic goodness of Pope Paul’s new rite:

Although we have the Mass in the traditional Roman rite as the rite proper to our Apostolic Administration, the participation of the faithful or the concelebration of one of our priests or its bishop at a Mass in the rite officially promulgated by the Church’s hierarchy, determined by it to be legitimate and adopted by it, as is the case of the Mass celebrated in the current Roman rite, cannot be considered a bad action or one susceptible of the least criticism....28

Our purpose, assuredly, is to combat herewith the doctrinal error of those who consider the New Mass as it was officially promulgated by the Church’s hierarchy to be sinful, and, consequently, who think it impossible to attend it without committing a sin, violently attacking those who in certain circumstances participate in it as if they had committed an offense against God.29

The Limits of Pope Benedict XVI’s Motu Proprio

In lines that were written before the promulgation of the Motu Proprio Summorum Pontificum, Bishop Rifan already displays an enthusiastic welcome for the extension of the traditional liturgy: “Our applause is won over by the much desired Motu Proprio of Benedict XVI, who will grant universal freedom for the Mass in the traditional Roman rite, which will be of benefit to the whole Church.”

It is undeniable that the recent Motu Proprio of July 7, 2007, represents an unprecedented expansion since 1969. But this expansion does not go so far as to make the traditional rite the ordinary and common expression of the law of prayer; the ordinary expression of this law remains the Novus Ordo Missae of Paul VI. In the text of the Motu Proprio, Article 1 contains the decisions made:

The Roman Missal promulgated by Paul VI is the ordinary expression of the Lex orandi (Law of prayer) of the Catholic Church of the Latin rite. Nonetheless, the Roman Missal promulgated by St. Pius V and reissued by Bl. John XXIII is to be considered as an extraordinary expression of that same Lex orandi, and must be given due honour for its venerable and ancient usage.

For the same “lex orandi,” we are told, there are two expressions, one of which is extraordinary in relation to the other.

The Motu Proprio of July 2007 thus introduced the cohabitation of the two missals, except that the two are not on the same level: a place is kept for the Catholic
Mass; honorable by reason of the antiquity of its usage, it was never abrogated and remains the extraordinary expression of the liturgical law. But the Catholic Mass must take a place beside the Novus Ordo Missae, which remains the ordinary expression of the liturgical law. Certainly, from the standpoint of the faithful and priests who want to continue defending Catholic worship, a small place is not nothing, and it is even better than nothing at all. But from the standpoint of the Roman authorities, who want to continue imposing the liturgical reform of 1969 as the ordinary expression of the law, this little place must be inscribed in the liturgical pantheon, which is on an equal footing with the catechetical and dogmatic pantheon. A Pantheon or caravansary: such is the conciliar Church, in the image of modernism, which recognizes to all the religions, cults, and liturgies their expression, provided that they be living, that they be the spontaneous fruit of conscience and sensibility, the traditional sensibility included—why not? But with Archbishop Lefebvre, we persist in believing that the Catholic Mass merits much more than a little place beside the reformed Mass of Gregory XVI.

The conclusion that retains our interest is the following: the Motu Proprio of Benedict XVI does not put an end to the state of necessity, and necessitates the continuing resistance of faithful Catholics in favor of the Catholic rite of the Mass, which must be recognized as the ordinary expression of the law of prayer (lex orandi) of the Catholic Church, to the exclusion of the new reformed rite of 1969. The law of belief does indeed depend upon the law of prayer. If there are two expressions, one good and the other bad, of the “lex orandi,” then there are equally two beliefs, one good and the other bad. The same principle holds true: “Lex orandi statuat legem credendi.” The belief of the people must be regulated by the expression of the liturgy (this is a necessary consequence). The missal conditions the faithful’s profession of faith. Corresponding to a bad missal is bad belief. In order to restore the good belief completely, it does not enough to set the good missal beside the bad one; it is necessary to re-establish the traditional Missal of 1962 as the ordinary expression of the law of prayer to the exclusion of the missal of Paul VI.

In spite of certain undeniably positive aspects, Benedict XVI’s act brings nothing that might justify Bishop Rifan’s attitude. There is matter to justify, to the contrary, the attitude of the Society of St. Pius X.  

**Religious Liberty and the State of Necessity**

The declaration Dignitatis Humanae on Religious Freedom explicitly contradicts the teaching of the preceding Tradition.

Religious liberty was condemned by Pope Gregory XVI (1830-46) in the Encyclical Mirari Vos of August 15, 1832, then by Pope Pius IX (1846-78) in the Encyclical Quanta Cura of December 8, 1864. This error can be summarized in two points: (1) “the best political regime and the progress of civil society absolutely require that human society be constituted and governed without making any distinction between the true and false religions” and consequently, “the best condition of society is that in which the civil authority does not have a duty to suppress by legal penalties the violators of Catholic law, except insofar as keeping the peace may require; (2) freedom of conscience and of worship is a right due to every man; this right must be proclaimed and guaranteed by the law in every well-organized society; the citizens have a right to complete freedom to manifest openly and publicly their opinions whatever they may be, by means of speech, the printed word or any other means, which neither the civil nor ecclesiastical authority may limit.”

This twofold condemnation bears upon two different expressions of one and the same error, the error of the religious indifferentism of the public power. The first expression: Civil authorities must not intervene to repress the external manifestations of false religions in the framework of life in society. Second expression: individuals have a right not to be prevented by the civil authorities from exercising the exterior acts of their religion, true or false, in the external forum of life in society. This condemned error now forms the basis of all modern democracies. In his recent speech at the UN, Pope Benedict XVI, far from challenging this state of affairs, sees in it the logical culmination of the reforms undertaken by the Second Vatican Council. The false principle condemned by Gregory XVI and Pius IX has become the charter of the new social doctrine of the Conciliar Church.

**Religious Liberty in the Declaration Dignitatis Humanae**

**a. The text of Dignitatis Humanae**

The essential passage is in §2:

This Vatican Synod declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are to be immune from coerion on the part of individuals or of social groups and of any human power, in such wise that in matters religious no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs. Nor is anyone to be restrained from acting in accordance with his own beliefs, whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits. The Synod further declares that the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person, as this dignity is known through the revealed Word of God and by reason itself. This right of the human person to religious freedom is to be recognized in the constitutional
law whereby society is governed. Thus it is to become a civil right.

This passage can be broken down into the following three propositions: (1) Religious freedom is a right proper to the human person; (2) This right must be recognized and guaranteed by the law in every society; (3) This right means that everyone must be free from all constraint whether from individuals or social groups or any human power whatsoever, such that in matters religious, no one may be compelled to act against his conscience nor prevented from acting, according to his conscience, in private as in public, alone or in association with others, within due limits.

b. The meaning of the text

The text does not teach (at least in §2) freedom of individual consciences in matters religious in the sense of the religious indifferentism of individuals; that is to say, in the sense that every man would have the right to choose the religion he likes (whether it be true or false objectively), without regard for any objective moral order. The text teaches the freedom of individual external acts in matters religious in the sense that every man has the right not to be prevented by the civil authorities from exercising in the external forum of life in society, the religious acts that he feels in conscience obliged to accomplish, provided that these acts do not trouble the public order; this amounts to the teaching of the religious indifferentism of the civil authorities. In effect, the right thus defined implies that the civil authorities must not intervene in the external forum of life in society, whether in favor of the true religion or disfavor of false religions unless the public order would happen to be threatened.

Religious indifferentism in general corresponds to two distinct errors: the religious indifferentism of individuals and the religious indifferentism of the secular power. Section 2 of Dignitatis Humanae teaches the second error without teaching the first. But the teaching prior to Vatican II condemns the second error as well as the first, for there is a link of cause and effect between the second error and the first: man being a political animal, if he lives in a society in which the public powers profess indifferentism, he will finish by professing the same indifferentism. This is why this passage of Dignitatis Humanae is condemned as such by the previous magisterium. This passage teaches the second error, which is the very negation of the Social Kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ.

c. The question of due limits

The indifferentism of civil authorities is described when No. 2 of Dignitatis Humanae indicates what are the external acts which men may, as a consequence of this freedom from constraint, accomplish or not. The text then speaks of “due limits.” But this mention does not aim at restraining the specifically religious domain of the liberty in question. The exercise of a right can have extrinsic limits when the concrete exercise of a right, specifically defined by a property (in this instance the “religious” domain), oversteps this domain in virtue of other related properties. There are mixed matters, where certain limits will restrain the exercise of a right not by reason of the proper matter of the right, but by reason of another matter that coincides in fact with the proper matter of the right.

For example, a religious procession on a public thoroughfare involves the religious domain as such, but also affects the domain of traffic circulation. The two facts coincide, but remain distinct nonetheless. If the procession is limited because it impinges on the traffic of the route followed, the limit in question is extrinsic to the religious domain. On the other hand, the fact of exercising a true or false religion is an action intrinsic to the religious domain, and if this action is limited (for example, if the authorities allow the funeral procession of Baron James de Rothschild to the Père-Lachaise Cemetery while forbidding the Corpus Christi procession), the limit in question is intrinsic to the religious domain. As such, the properly religious domain of the right recognized by Dignitatis Humanae is without intrinsic limits because it is ascribed to all religions, true or false. At most there will be extrinsic limits taking into account the circumstances in which the right in favor of religion (whether true or false) is exercised.

d. A coherent text

This mention of “due limits” must be understood, then, not in relation to the objective order of the true religion, but in relation to the objective order of civil society, and signifies that the exercise of a religion, whether true or false, must respect good order and public peace. That is why this restriction of the right takes away absolutely nothing of the fundamental perversity of the false principle of religious liberty. Even if it imposes on the exercise of religion the limits required for the sake of public tranquility, the State remains absolutely indifferent to the truth or falseness of religion.33

(To be continued.)

2 Ibid., pp.118-19.
3 See Archbishop Lefebvre, Homily at Ecône, May 14, 1989, in Vu de Haut, No. 13, Fall 2006, p.70.
4 John Paul II, Motu Proprio Ecclesia DeiAdflicta, §5 [English version from Vatican web site].
5 Code of Canon Law (1917), Canon 682, and 1983 Code, Canon 213: “The Christian faithful have the right to receive assistance from the sacred pastors out of the spiritual goods of the Church, especially the word of God and the sacraments.”
6 Archbishop Lefebvre, Homily at Ecône for the Chrismal Mass of Holy Thursday, March 27, 1986.
8 “Today, this day, is Operation Survival. If I had made this deal with Rome, by continuing with the agreements we had signed, and by putting them into practice, I would have
13 “It seems that if one excludes from Assisi every thought of religious syncretism, this
14 The liturgy is a theological place. The Novus Ordo Missae of 1969 implements in particular the
15 Rifan, p. 16.
16 “The Eldest Daughter of the Church,” numbered 20,523 priests (diocesan and religious) in
17 the Encyclical Mortalium Animos of Pope Pius XI (January 6, 1928) to be reminded
18 The Mass of All Time, translation by Fr. Anthony Cekada (1969; reprint, Rockford, Ill.:
19 “The New Mass is not good! If it were good, then tomorrow we would have to start
20 “This Mass is corrupted; this Mass is bad: it makes us gradually lose the faith,” then we are
22 Ibid., p.47.
23 This reading of §2 of Errors IX’s Syllabus of 1870 is confirmed in parallel places of the document:
24 For more details about the Motu Proprio, the reader may refer to the article published in the
25 The religious indifferentism of individuals is condemned in Proposition 15 of Pope Pius
26 “The New Mass leads to sin against faith, and that is one of the most serious of sins, the most dangerous of sins,...the
27 Ibid., p.66-68, with n. 97. Source of information on the the affair: Jean Madiran, “Sur la Lettre du Cardinal Ottaviani à Paul VI,” Supplément au no. 142 d’Itinéraires,” April 1970. On page 6, this study shows that the letter was published at the instigation of Mgr.
28 Ibid., p.54, n. 71.
29 Ibid., p.67.
30 The New Ordo Missae, by the omissions and mutations it introduces into the Ordinary of the Mass and by many of its general norms, which indicate the conception and the nature of the new missal in its essential points, does not express as it should the theology of the holy sacrifice of the Mass established by the holy Council of Trent in its Session 22, a fact which simple catechesis does not succeed in counterbalancing...The Novus Ordo not only does not sustain fervor but on the contrary diminishes faith in the central truths of the Catholic life, such as the real presence of Jesus in the Blessed Sacrament, the reality of the propitiatory sacrifice, and hierarchical priesthood.”
31 Rifan, Tradition, p.54, n.70.
32 See Le Sel de la Terre, No. 37, Summer 2001, p.33ff.
33 Bishop de Castro Mayer was careful to state that the considerations on an eventual heresy of the Sovereign Pontiff remained purely theoretical and did not imply any intention of analyzing the particulars of the present situation in the Church.
35 Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre, Courrier de Rome, July 1974.
36 “The New Mass is not good! If it were good, then tomorrow we would have to start saying it, obviously. If it is good, we must obey. If the Church gives us something good and tells us ‘You must take it,’ what reason could there be to say no? Whereas, if we say, ‘This Mass is corrupted; this Mass is bad: it makes us gradually lose the faith,’ then we are indeed obliged to refuse it.” Quoted in The Mass of All Time (2005; English version: Angelus Press, 2007), p. 271.
38 Ibid., No. 37, Summer 2001, p.34. Bishop de Castro Mayer was careful to state that the considerations on an eventual heresy of the Sovereign Pontiff remained purely theoretical and did not imply any intention of analyzing the particulars of the present situation in the Church.
40 Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre, Courrier de Rome, July 1974.
41 “The New Mass is not good! If it were good, then tomorrow we would have to start
42 “The New Mass leads to sin against faith, and that is one of the most serious of sins, the most dangerous of sins,...the
43 For more details about the Motu Proprio, the reader may refer to the article published in the September 2007 of Courrier de Rome [and in the January 2008 issue of SiSiNoNo].
44 For more details, the reader may wish to consult the exclusive interview with the Most Reverend Bernard Fellay, in Nouvelles de Chrétienté, No. 111, May-June 2008, online at www.dici.org.
45 The religious indifferentism of individuals is condemned in Proposition 15 of Pope Pius
46 “The New Mass leads to sin against faith, and that is one of the most serious of sins, the most dangerous of sins,...the
47 For more details about the Motu Proprio, the reader may refer to the article published in the September 2007 of Courrier de Rome [and in the January 2008 issue of SiSiNoNo].
48 This reading of §2 of Dei Gratissimae Humanae is confirmed in parallel places of the document:
49 the end of §§3, 7, 10, and 12.
The STaTe of NECESSITY

PART II

Bishop Rifan’s Incoherent Reading

Confusion between Two Errors

For Bishop Rifan, “there is no real contradiction between what Blessed Pius IX taught and what Dignitatis Humanae, the Declaration on Religious Freedom, teaches.” According to him, Pius IX condemned religious liberty understood as the absence of a moral obligation for the individual conscience to embrace the true religion (the error of personal or individual religious indifferentism), while Dignitatis Humanae teaches religious liberty understood as the individual’s right to be free from constraint by civil authorities in the public exercise of religion. But the teaching of Vatican II corresponds to the error of the religious indifferentism of civil authorities, equally condemned by Pius IX. It suffices to compare the texts to realize that Bishop Rifan’s interpretation is completely unfounded. Pius IX condemned not only the error of the indifferentism of individuals, but also and more precisely the error of the indifferentism of the State based upon the principle that the civil authorities must not prevent the
The Negative Right: A Previously Refuted Thesis

Finally, Bishop Rifan adopts the argument used by Fr. Basil of Le Barroux,\(^5\) which was refuted by Fr. Jehan de Belleville,\(^6\) also of Le Barroux. According to this argument,

the Council merely affirms a negative right, without conceding any affirmative rights to persons in their acts not in conformity with the truth or the good in matters religious.\(^7\)

The distinction between a negative right and an affirmative right in this context is equivalent to a distinction between the right not to be impeded from acting and the right to act. However, it is a sophistical distinction, for, as St. Thomas says,\(^8\) every negation is based on an affirmation; if one has the right not to be prevented from acting (negation) it is because one has the right to act (affirmation).

To be fair, we should make it clear that Fr. Basil’s argumentation is in reality more nuanced than the short summary given by Bishop Rifan would lead one to believe. According to the Benedictine, *Dignitatis Humanae* proclaims not the right to act but the right not to be prevented from acting in the sense that even if an objectively bad action as such has no objective right, the person who does it has the subjective (or personal) right not to be prevented if he is in good faith. But it suffices to refer to the notion of right defined by Aristotle and St. Thomas to comprehend right away the sophism underlying this position. For in fact a right is inherently objective and not subjective; the right to act and the right not to be prevented from acting are identical, and both are ascribed not to the person who acts but to the action with its object. For it is essentially the object of an action which is at the root of a right, that is to say of the justice and hence the moral goodness of an action.\(^9\) The dispositions of the person accomplishing it (invincible ignorance, good faith, good intention) cannot remedy the intrinsic malice of an action. That is why the State ought to prevent intrinsically evil actions in the external forum of life in society even if those who accomplish them are in good faith. In practice, of course, the heads of state are unable to prevent evil always and everywhere. Human government imitates that of God, who allows evil in order not to place an obstacle to a greater good or to avoid a worse evil. But this exercise of tolerance is a matter of prudence and not of justice: it implies no strict right, either positive or negative, in favor of evil.

It is this negative right “not to be restrained from acting” which is explicitly condemned as such by Pope Pius IX in *Quanta Cura*. The Pope condemns the proposition that

liberty of conscience and worship is each man’s personal right, which ought to be legally proclaimed and

exercise of false religions in the external forum, which is tantamount to denying the social kingship of our Lord Jesus Christ.

The two equally condemned errors (indifferentism of the individual and of the State) are quite distinct. In theory, the second error can be professed without professing the first, even though there is a link of cause and effect between the two. This, moreover, is an attribute of both liberal Catholicism and of modernism, which (indirectly) instill the indifferentism of the individual conscience by at first restricting moral duty to the limits of the individual conscience. Even if apparently §1 of *Dignitatis Humanae* rejects the error of the indifferentism of individuals, even if apparently §2 of this document does not teach it, even if the expressed and various authorized declarations have stated at the time of the Council\(^2\) and afterwards\(^3\) that the documents of Vatican II did not teach the first error, it nonetheless remains that §2 of *Dignitatis Humanae* confirms the error of the indifferentism of the State. That is why all the passages cited by Bishop Rifan are beside the point.

A Too Rapid Inference

Bishop Rifan is mistaken about the real thrust of *Dignitatis Humanae* because in his reading of it he makes no distinction between the internal forum of acts of conscience and the external forum of acts done in public. He says:

The Council teaches from the natural point of view a right not to be forced or prevented from acting within due limits in matters religious by the State. That is to say that the Council affirms that in matters of conscience the civil power lacks jurisdiction; it is relatively incompetent.\(^1\)

But keeping to the exact meaning of *Dignitatis Humanae*, it must be said that the inference Bishop Rifan makes by linking these two phrases by means of “that is to say” is incorrect. It is true that, as he says in his second statement, the State does not have power to act directly on internal acts of conscience. But the text of *Dignitatis Humanae* says much more than that. In his first statement, Bishop Rifan says that the State does not have the power to compel external actions accomplished in the framework of life in society. The first assertion logically implies the second, for if one lacks the power to compel external actions, all the more so does one lack the power to compel internal acts. But the second statement does not necessarily imply the first, for it is possible to Lack power to act on internal acts while possessing the power to act on external ones. That is why the two statements are not strictly equivalent, the first saying more than then second.\(^7\)
asserted in every rightly constituted society; and that a right resides in the citizens to an absolute liberty, which should be restrained by no authority whether ecclesiastical or civil.

This is the condemnation of the religious indifferentism of the civil authorities in the sense that they should not “restrain [anyone] from acting,” the error taught by §2 of Dignitatis Humanae in contradiction with Tradition before Vatican II and the social kingship of our Lord Jesus Christ.

The Coherence of the Conciliar Texts

Thus far we have shown that the teaching of religious freedom in Dignitatis Humanae regarding the indifferentism of the State incurs Pius IX’s condemnation. We must now see whether the condemnation is limited to this error alone and examine whether §1 of Dignitatis Humanae really rejects the indifferentism of individuals or merely seems to.

a. A traditional appearance

It is true that this text begins by making an assertion in apparent opposition to the error of private indifferentism condemned by Gregory XVI and Pius IX:

First, this sacred Synod professes its belief that God himself has made known to mankind in which men are to serve Him, and thus be saved in Christ and come to blessedness. We believe that this one true religion subsists in the Catholic and apostolic Church, to which the Lord Jesus committed the duty of spreading it abroad among all men. Thus He spoke to the apostles: “Go, therefore, and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you” (Mt. 28:19-2). On their part, all men are bound to seek the truth, especially in what concerns God and His Church, and to embrace the truth they come to know, and to hold fast to it.

This sacred Synod likewise professes its belief that it is upon the human conscience that these obligations fall and exert their binding force. The truth cannot impose itself except by virtue of its own truth, as it makes its entrance into the mind at once quietly and with power. Religious freedom in turn, which men demand as necessary to fulfill their duty to worship God, has to do with immunity from coercion in civil society. Therefore, it leaves untouched traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ.

b. But an appearance only

Apparently, then, or at least directly, the text of Dignitatis Humanae does not seem to oppose the statements of Popes Gregory XVI and Pius IX concerning the condemnation of the indifferentism of individuals. But in reality, things are not quite so simple, for §1 of Dignitatis Humanae contains the ambiguous expression “subsists in,” which recurs here, taking it from Lumen Gentium, §8. This expression opens the way to a new, much subtler form of private individualism and inexorably leads, albeit indirectly, to the conclusion condemned by Gregory XVI in Mirari Vos and by Pius IX in Quanta Curam and the Syllabus of Errors: one may indeed hope for salvation outside the one true religion, since religious communities other than the Catholic Church have by no means been deprived of significance and importance in the mystery of salvation. For the Spirit of Christ has not refrained from using them as means of salvation which derive their efficacy from the very fullness of grace and truth entrusted to the Catholic Church.

The end of this passage is also remarkable: it states that religious freedom, the subject of the following discussion, “leaves untouched traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ.” Here it is not a question of “the Catholic Church” in which, it is said a few lines above, the one true Church subsists; rather, it is a question of “the one Church of Christ.” This is another snare from Lumen Gentium §8. The true religion is the one exercised only in the one Church of Christ. But the Catholic Church is only the community in which this one true religion and this one Church of Christ subsist. Now, we know (thanks to a document of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith of June 29, 2007,18 what the expression “subsists in” means: to subsist means to exist fully, as opposed to existing partially. The text of §1 thus states that the religion binding on all men is the one exercised not only fully in the Catholic Church, but also more or less in the other religions, which are so many partial elements of the one Church of Christ.

Dignitatis Humanae: A Text Contradicting Tradition from A to Z and from No. 2 to No. 1

Consequently, to state that “it leaves untouched traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ” is to deny the truth. Indeed, either the text of Dignitatis Humanae understands the expressions “true religion” and “one Church of Christ” in the sense suggested by the context in parallel places of Lumen Gentium and Unitatis Redintegratio, in which case the...
doctrine that religious liberty leaves untouched is not the traditional Catholic doctrine; or else the text understands these same expressions in the traditional Catholic sense, in which case religious freedom does not leave untouched the doctrine they express.

Contrary to the appearances, §1 of Dignitatis Humanae is perfectly coherent with §2: the moral obligation imposed on individuals does not concern the one true religion as it is preached by the one true Catholic Church; it concerns religion not only as it is preached in the Catholic Church, but also in the false religions considered as such. The indifferentism of the State which is the subject in §2 is rooted in a new, subtler form of the indifferentism of individuals discussed in §1.

Benedict XVI and the Authentic Interpretation of Vatican II

We can also see that the different declarations of Pope Benedict XVI do not corroborate Bishop Rifen’s rereading of the text. Until now, the successor of John Paul II has not yet done anything to correct the most seriously defective teachings of the Council; on the contrary.

a. Benedict XVI and Religious Liberty

In his Christmas Address to the Roman Curia of December 22, 2005, Pope Benedict XVI makes a distinction between the two meanings possible for “freedom of religion.” In the sense that it would be the equivalent of an independence of the conscience in relation to the divine authority fixing the objective rule of morality (thus, in the sense of the indifferentism of the individual) the expression is to be reproved, according to the Holy Father. But in the sense that it would be the equivalent of the absence of any and all constraint in the external forum on the part of the civil authorities, the expression is, according to him, just. Further on, the Pope adds:

The martyrs of the early Church died for their faith in that God who was revealed in Jesus Christ, and for this very reason they also died for freedom of conscience and the freedom to profess one’s own faith: a profession that no State can impose but which, instead, can only be claimed with God’s grace in freedom of conscience.

This passage could at the most have an equivocal sense, for it is true that the profession of faith cannot be imposed by the State in the internal forum of the conscience, whereas it is false that the profession of faith cannot be imposed by the State in the external forum of society. Moreover, the Pope is not speaking here of the profession of the one true faith; he is simply speaking of martyrs who claimed the freedom to profess their own faith, which can be understood in the subjective sense.

But subsequently, other addresses of the Pope have dispelled this ambiguity and proven that Benedict XVI speaks of freedom understood in the sense condemned by Gregory XVI in Mirari Vos and by Pius IX in Quanta Cura. Indeed, the Pope claims the right for all believers to profess their religion publicly in society without the State being able to intervene in any way whatsoever. Moreover, in his Address of 2005, Benedict XVI already said that the Vatican II had wished to ratify “an essential principle of the modern State.” This remark should prick our ears, for it strikes us as an echo of the former reflections of Cardinal Ratzinger, who presented the teachings of Vatican II on religious freedom as a “countersyllabus.”

One year after his famous speech on the hermeneutic of the Council, Pope Benedict XVI unequivocally indicated what the meaning of this religious freedom is in the Address of November 28, 2006, to the diplomatic corps of the Turkish Republic:

The civil authorities of every democratic country are duty-bound to guarantee the effective freedom of all believers and to permit them to organize freely the life of their religious communities.

Especially during his recent trip to the United States, Benedict XVI forcefully repeated the same ideas in his Speech to the United Nations Assembly on April 18, 2008:

Human rights, of course, must include the right to religious freedom....The full guarantee of religious liberty cannot be limited to the free exercise of worship, but has to give due consideration to the public dimension of religion, and hence to the possibility of believers playing their part in building the social order.

He adds that the principle of religious liberty is “directed towards attaining freedom for every believer.”

b. Benedict XVI and Ecumenism

Far from correcting the faulty teaching of Dignitatis Humanae on religious freedom, Pope Benedict XVI’s speeches clearly and forcefully confirm it. On the other hand we can see that Pope Benedict XVI, no more than did Pope John Paul II, does not flinch the consequence of this teaching; indeed, the consequence of religious freedom is ecumenism. Without entering into details about his visit to the synagogue of Cologne in 2004 or his trip to the Middle East in 2006, we can see very well that, during the ecumenical meeting held at Naples on 21 October 2007, Benedict XVI did not hide his intentions. He explained:

Today’s meeting takes us back in spirit to 1986, when my venerable Predecessor John Paul II invited important Religious Representatives to the hills of St Francis to
pray for peace, stressing on that occasion the intrinsic ties that combine an authentic religious attitude with keen sensitivity to this fundamental good of humanity.

And he added: “While respecting the differences of the various religions, we are all called to work for peace.” It is clear that the spirit of Benedict XVI is still the spirit of Assisi.

The conclusion that interests us is the following: the declarations of Pope Benedict XVI and his ecumenical endeavors do not bring an end to the state of necessity. The authentic interpretation of Vatican II given by the present pope still upholds in principle the same errors denounced long ago by Archbishop Lefebvre and Bishop de Castro Mayer in their Open Letter to Pope John Paul II. This letter alone reduces to nothing Bishop Risan’s sophistry.

**Twenty Years after the Episcopal Consecrations: Operation Survival Continues**

Twenty years have passed since the episcopal consecrations of June 30, 1988. Pope Benedict XVI denounces the abuses ascribed to the spirit of the Council, but he preaches fidelity to the empowered letter of the Council. He declares that the traditional missal was never abrogated, but he sees in it the extraordinary expression of the liturgical law in concurrence with the protestantized Novus Ordo, which in his eyes remains the ordinary expression of this same law.

This duality which divides Benedict XVI’s government between a faultless fidelity to the erroneous principles of the Council and an appearance of a return to order is perfectly explained in the logic of the modernist system. Modernism, which is religion in progress and perpetual evolution, results, said St. Pius X, “from the conflict of two forces, one of them tending towards progress, the other towards conservation.” The force tending towards conservation is authority, which represses abuses; the force tending towards progress is the imperatives of the Council. And we can see how the conciliar authorities are always looking for a balance and trying to counterbalance the two contradictory tendencies against each other, the progressives against the conservatives.

The conservative tendency will at the most go so far as to authorize a certain personal attachment of some of the faithful to pre-conciliar Tradition. But this would not justify a conclusion that the state of necessity has ended. The dilemma remains the same, between a false blind obedience and legitimate resistance for the sake of perpetuating the Catholic Faith. Even today we must still choose the latter.

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1 “This Vatican Synod declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individuals or of social groups and of any human power, in such wise that [1] in matters religious no one is to be forced to act in a manner contrary to his own beliefs. [2] Nor is anyone to be restrained from acting in accordance with his own beliefs whether privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others, within due limits” (Dignitatis Humanae, §2). (Emphasis added.) Bishop Risan, Traditions et magistère vivant (Le Barroux: Editions St. Madeleine, 2007), p.96. See also p.92, n.130: Bishop Risan borrows this explanation from Fr. Lucien, Fr. Basil of Le Barroux, and from Fr. Louis-Marie de Blignières. For more details about this question, see Le Sel de la Terre, No. 56 (Spring 2006), pp.183-87.

2 Bishop Risan, ibid., pp.94-95, quotes the official report given on the text of Dignitatis Humanae by Bishop Emile De Smedt on November 19, 1963.

3 Ibid., pp.99-103. Bishop Risan quotes long passages of the Catechism of the Catholic Church (1992) which are along the same lines as Bishop De Smedt’s report.

4 Bishop Risan, ibid., p.96.

5 The thesis of Father Basil, La liberté religieuse et la tradition Catholique (Le Barroux: 1998) reviewed in Le Sel de la Terre, No.30 (2000) in six volumes comprising 2,960 pages and 9,154 notes, has only a material advantage, for if one has the patience to read it to the end, it becomes evident that there is a lot of hot air. A new, condensed version in one volume is not any more convincing.

6 Jehan de Belleville, O.S.B., Droit objectif dans Dignitatis Humanae: La liberté religieuse à la lumière de la doctrine juridique d’Aristote et de St. Thomas d’Aquin (Rome, 2004).

7 Bishop Risan, Tradition et le magistère vivant, p.96.

8 Disputed question De Maio, O.Q., Art.1, ad 9.

9 See Sel de la Terre, No. 56 (Spring, 2006), pp.180-82.


11 Bishop Risan (Tradition, p.103), claims nevertheless to rely on the Discourse of December 22, 2005. 

12 “...if religious freedom were to be considered an expression of the human inability to discover the truth and thus become a canonization of relativism, then this social and historical necessity is raised inappropriately to the metaphysical level and thus stripped of its true meaning. Consequently, it cannot be accepted by those who believe that the human person is capable of knowing the truth about God and, on the basis of the inner dignity of the truth, is bound to this knowledge” (translation available on the Vatican’s Web site).

13 “It is quite different, on the other hand, to perceive religious freedom as a need that derives from human coexistence, or indeed, as an intrinsic consequence of the truth that cannot be externally imposed but that the person must adopt only through the process of conviction. The Second Vatican Council, recognizing and making its own an essential principle of the modern State with the Decree on Religious Freedom, has recovered the deepest patrimony of the Church” (ibid.)


15 Meeting with the Diplomatic Corps to the Republic of Turkey, November 28, 2006 (online at vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches).

16 Address to the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization, April 18, 2008 (online at vatican.va).

17 Greeting to the Heads of Delegations taking part in the International Encounter for Peace at the Episcopal Seminar of Capodimonte, October 21, 2007 (online at www.vatican.va).

The Demolition of Orthodoxy

Neomodernism is demolishing orthodoxy stone by stone, by repeated blows, blows which, through an unnameable tolerance and sometimes a veritable complicity, are allowed by those in charge, who wash their hands like Pilate. Numerous “masters in Israel” vie to create a media spectacle; there is a whole cortege of improvised disciples: neo-exegetes, neo-theologians…neo-this and neo-that, disposed to joyously trample the Faith in the name of the fairy-queen of a global, ultimately adogmatic religion. An example of this continuous demolition of the most certain truths is the attack on the doctrine of limbo.

In its July-August 2007 edition, Courrier de Rome published an article that demonstrated in great detail the doctrinal falsity of the assertion that the existence of limbo is a mere “theological hypothesis.” In fact, it is neither an hypothesis nor a fable that the “New Evangelization” could sweep away, opening wide the gates of Paradise to all unbaptized infants. In this issue we will review the teachings of the Apostolic magisterium prior to Vatican II, with the clarification that if a rightly understood, homogeneous evolution of doctrine is certainly possible, the involution and contradiction of truths already legitimately set forth ought to be rejected out of hand. It is certainly possible that a less clear truth may acquire greater clarity, but the contrary is false, given that a clearly explained truth tranquilly taught in theology and by the constant and universal magisterium of the Truth cannot undergo an involution, and still less a cancellation. In effect, the Holy Spirit, who leads the Church, does not begin by teaching a truth only to authorize its being discarded.

The Voice of the Apostolic Magisterium

1) The Council of Carthage (418) energetically defends the baptism of infants (and thus the doctrine of limbo) in the following articles:

Whoever says that infants fresh from their mothers’ wombs ought not to be baptized, or says that they are indeed baptized unto the remission of sins, but that they draw nothing of the original sin from Adam, which is expiated in the bath of regeneration…let him be anath-
ema. Since what the Apostle says: “Through one man sin entered into the world [and through sin death], and so passed into all men, in whom all have sinned” [cf. Rom. 5:12] must not to be understood otherwise than as the Catholic Church spread everywhere has always understood it. For on account of this rule of faith even infants, who in themselves thus far have not been able to commit any sin, are therefore truly baptized unto the remission of sins, so that that which they have contracted from generation may be cleansed in them by regeneration.2

It is a truth of faith, then, that infants are born with original sin (cf. Rom. 5:12); this can only be effaced by baptism (“nisi renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto non potest introire in Regnum Dei”—Jn. 3:5). Baptism of desire also exists, but it is not possible except for those who have attained the use of reason, which is certainly not the case of infants and young children.

If anyone says that for this reason the Lord said: “In my Father’s house there are many mansions” [Jn. 14:2] that it might be understood that in the kingdom of heaven there will be some middle place or some place anywhere where the blessed infants live who departed from this life without baptism, without which they cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven, which is life eternal, let him be anathema.3

The canon is formal: children who die without baptism cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal life.

2) Pope Innocent III (beginning of the 13th century), in an apostolic letter to the Archbishop Imbert of Arles, affirmed this among other things:

We say that a distinction must be made, that sin is twofold: namely, original and actual: original, which is contracted without consent; and actual, which is committed with consent. Original, therefore, which is committed without consent, is remitted without consent through the power of the sacrament; but actual, which is contracted with consent, is not mitigated in the slightest without consent.... The punishment of original sin is deprivation of the vision of God, but the punishment of actual sin is the torments of everlasting hell.4

3) The Council of Florence (1442), in the decree Pro Jacobitis, affirmed:

Regarding children, indeed, because of danger of death, which can often take place, when no help can be brought to them by another remedy than through the sacrament of baptism, through which they are snatched from the domination of the Devil and adopted among the sons of God, it advises that holy baptism ought not to be deferred for forty or eighty days, or any time according to the observance of certain people, but it should be conferred as soon as it can be done conveniently, but so that, when danger of death is imminent, they be baptized in the form of the Church, early without delay, even by a layman or woman, if a priest should be lacking.5

4) Pope Pius VI (1794), in his Apostolic Constitution Auctorem Fidei, condemned 83 propositions of the Jansenist Synod of Pistoia, including the following:

The doctrine which rejects as a Pelagian fable, that place of the lower regions (which the faithful generally designate by the name of the limbo of children) in which the souls of those departing with the sole guilt of original sin are punished with the punishment of the condemned exclusive of the punishment of fire, just as if, by this very fact, that these who remove the punishment of fire introduced that middle place and state free of guilt and of punishment between the kingdom of God and eternal damnation, such as that about which the Pelagians idly talk—false, rash, injurious to Catholic schools.6

5) Pope St. Pius X, in his Catechism of Christian Doctrine (1912), wrote:

Children who die without baptism go to limbo, where they do not enjoy God, but neither do they suffer, for having original sin, and only this, they do not merit to enter Paradise, but neither do they merit purgatory or hell.7

In an apostolic letter to Cardinal Vicar Pietro Respighi, speaking of his Catechism, the holy pope wrote that the faithful will find it a brief, very precise summary, even in format, in which they will find explained with great simplicity the principal divine truths and the most useful Christian reflections.8

How can anyone think that limbo is a simple “theological hypothesis” that can be tranquilly suppressed?

6) Pope Pius XII, speaking of the necessity of baptism, confirms:

If what We have said up to now concerns the protection and care of natural life, much more so must it concern the supernatural life, which the newly born receives with baptism. In the present economy there is no other way to communicate that life to the child who has not attained the use of reason. Above all, the state of grace is absolutely necessary at the moment of death; without it, salvation and supernatural happiness—the beatific vision of God—are impossible. An act of love is sufficient for the adult to obtain sanctifying grace and to supply the lack of baptism; to the still unborn or newly born this way is not open.

A Convenient Interpretation

The last act of the supreme magisterium, which officially blocked the interpretation of the doctrine of limbo as a whimsical hypothesis, could not go unmentioned by the International Theological...
Commission, which in fact, in its last document aimed at suppressing the Catholic doctrine of limbo, gave its own interpretation, asserting that

Pius XII rather recalled the limits within which the debate must take place and reasserted firmly the moral obligation to provide Baptism to infants in danger of death.\(^9\)

In reality, the Commission did not correctly understand the pontifical message: Pius XII authorized no “debate” on limbo, but wished to confirm that baptism is absolutely necessary for salvation, for if baptism of desire exists for adults in a state of invincible ignorance, this is not the case for infants and children who have not yet reached the use of reason. And if for children without the use of reason baptism is a “conditio sine qua non” for obtaining supernatural life, this also holds true for obtaining the beatific vision; whence the traditional teaching on limbo as a strictly theological conclusion confirmed by repeated and precise statements of the magisterium, which no one can suppress on the pretext that this teaching is but a vain imagining fit only for the memory hole.

The International Theological Commission cannot wander outside the rails set by biblical truth, which is of divine faith: “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.”\(^10\) That is what Fr. Michel, author of several articles on the subject published in L’Ami du Clergé, wrote:

Undoubtedly, the Catholic doctrine implied in the dogma of the necessity of baptism for the remission of original sin is that children who die without baptism cannot enjoy the beatific vision. If this conclusion cannot yet be considered a dogma of faith insofar as it has not yet been proposed directly as such by the Church’s magis-

\(^*\) Stephanus


1 Name of the French edition of SiSiNoNo. This article appeared in the The Angelus (Nov. 2007).
3 Ibid., n. 2.
4 Dz. 410.
5 Dz. 712.
6 Dz. 1526.
7 St. Pius X. Catechism of Christian Doctrine, §100.
8 AAS, December 2, 1912, pp.690-92.
10 Jn. 3:5.