It has been some 350 years since Rene Descartes called
upon man to change his fundamental orientation towards nature. No longer was
the contemplative union of the human mind with the ordered world to be the
goal, rather, man was called upon to become "master of nature." This
mastership which man was to gain over nature was considered by Descartes,
and those who would follow his lead, to be the proper end of all
scientific knowing. Science was to be used as a tool and as a weapon in the
taming and domination of nature. No longer would scientia be
recognized as the mind’s grasping hold of the truth for its own sake.
From the very beginning of this effort to use science to
make man the "master of nature" (generally dated from the 17th
century), it became clear that nature was not completely amenable to such
attempts at absolute domination. The philosophers who sought to render
nature docile in this way, understood that in order to gain complete mastery
over nature, nature must be "made" into something which can be completely
mastered. In this we glimpse the grudging recognition that to be yoked to
the plow of human "progress," nature must become a completely predictable
and plodding beast of burden, which it most definitely is not in its
"natural" state. The way this act of alchemy was effected was through the
"philosopher’s stone" of an idea. From now on nature would be understood to
be a great cosmic machine. In this regard, nature did not become
a great machine, rather, it was thought of as if it were a
great machine. The distinction is essential here.
There was one reason why the machine was used as the
paradigm for describing nature. It was thought by the physicists and the
rationalist philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries that only such a
machine-like reality could be comprehensively analyzed through the use of a
mathematical method. For Descartes and for many after him, mathematical
reasoning became the form of human reasoning and the key by
which the secrets of nature could be unlocked. Needless to say, the results
of this total reliance upon the idea that nature was a mere mechanism were
not totally negative. In the 18th century, in Protestant Britain,
long after the cosmological proofs for the existence of God offered by St.
Thomas Aquinas were forgotten, a cosmological proof of a sort, comparing the
world to a pocket watch which must have been made by a master watchmaker,
still was common intellectual currency. It was this proof that drew the fire
of the Scottish "Enlightenment" thinker David Hume. The gist of his
incredibly facile counter-argument was that just because we experience an
ordered whole (i.e., the watch) that does not mean that we experience
the watch as the effect of an intelligent cause.
The only thing which the Mechanists, as those natural
philosophers who advanced this new view of nature were called, could not fit
into their system was the soul as it had been understood by
the great Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophical tradition. It wasn’t merely
the human intellectual soul which did not "fit" in their system, it was the
soul as the principle of animation in all living things. Since
neither soul nor animation can be understood mathematically, these
"obnoxious" facts of nature simply could not exit. Although Descartes tried
to salvage the human soul by reducing it to a "mind" whose purpose it was to
manipulate the mechanism of nature, he simply denied the reality of soul
and, therefore, animation or life to all nonhuman creatures. All that was
below man, even man’s own body, was simply a gear in the cosmic apparatus.
Just because the philosophers of the modern period were
able to think of nature in a certain way, this did not mean that
nature actually was that way. The machine model was simply a handy
way of understanding the whole. An example of the reality not fitting the
model appeared when Descartes’ dream of dramatically extending human
longevity and bringing the passions of the human heart under the perfect
control of reason by properly manipulating the "gears" of the human body,
proved to be a dream and nothing more. During most of the 300 years after
the death of Descartes, the great technological achievements of man did
nothing to alter "life," whether man’s own or the multifarious forms of
"life" which constituted Nature.
In the latter half of the 20th century, however, we have
witnessed a renewed attempt to dominate and determine the animated mystery
which is life. Through genetic engineering, cloning of animals, and through
the various ways empirical science has developed for both maintaining and
terminating life, that which has eluded human power since the beginning of
time is now being "engineered" to fit the desires and whims of contemporary
man. Life is subject to a two-pronged attack. The first is theoretical and
the second is practical. The theoretical attack involves the attempt to
redefine "life" so that that which was formerly shielded by the moral law,
now becomes open to manipulation. The practical attack involves the
scientific reduction to its component parts of that which was always
understood to be irreducible. In some way, life was always understood to be
a whole, either a thing had it or it did not. What the masters of modern
science are attempting to do is to alter the components of living things
without, except in the case of prenatal and partial birth abortion,
endangering the life of the thing being engineered.
Since animated life, specifically human life, has always
been protected from assault, at least in theory if not always in fact, by a
natural rational recognition of the fact that life is to be fostered rather
than destroyed, the New Engineers of Life must circumvent that ancient moral
demand by redefining life. Simply changing a definition is all that is
necessary to make what was universally considered to be living and,
therefore, a legitimate object of moral concern, into that which is
non-living and, on that account, not the proper object of moral concern. No
one, surely, minds using or disposing of that which is nonliving for the
sake of the living! We have heard that ideas have consequences, how much
more then do definitions have consequences!
Life: A New Definition
When we speak here of "life," of course, we are speaking
of biological life. Why this seeming reductionism? Intellectual and personal
life is life in its most perfect form. Isn’t that what we ought to be
speaking of? No, it isn’t. The reason I say this is that most, if not all,
of the bioethical "questions" which we are now confronting in our own time
have their origins as "difficulties" in the radical separation of personal
and intellectual life from biological life. For man, according to the
Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, conscious life can only be separated from
biological life after the death of the body. Rather than viewing man
as a whole and unified being, body, soul, intellect, passions, and
appetites, the first stage in the modernistic dislocation of man took place
when they, Descartes being the first, reduced human life to the life of
human consciousness and thereby relegating the body to the alien world of
the cosmic "pocket watch."
It is not surprising then that when we try to understand
the new "thinking" which justifies such contemporary phenomena as abortion,
infanticide, and euthanasia, we should encounter the same type of dichotomy
between human consciousness and the life of the human body. The reason this
dichotomy is important to understand is on account of the fact that by
reducing human life to intellectual consciousness, the modern ethicists
remove from the domain of the living and the domain of ethical relevancy
those persons who fail to display certain typical manifestations of human
consciousness. By doing this, the "remains" of the "formerly" human subject
become commodities to be used, taken, bought, and sold.
In the contemporary ethical scene, specifically the
ethical scene as it relates to bioethical questions, we see how new
definitions of "life," along with new definitions of "death," are
legitimizing actions which were formerly acknowledged as contrary to both
the Divine Law and the Natural Law. Both the new definition of life and the
new definition of death are based upon a Cartesian reduction of man to his
intellectual and conscious activity. It is based upon man’s "forgetting" of
the most obvious aspects of his own being.
By redefining "life," the merchants of death attempt to
justify abortion, prenatal and partial-birth, along with infanticide. By
redefining death, they attempt to justify euthanasia and the "harvesting" of
body parts from the comatose and those persons who have permanent or
temporary loss of higher brain functions. As an example of the former, we
find a pro-abortionist Sissela Bok in her article "Ethical Problems of
Abortion," attempting to justify the act by which the abortionist takes the
life of an innocent by denying that the unborn child meets the normal
criteria by which we judge a being to be both alive and human. According to
Ms. Bok, our concept of what it means to be a living human includes such
characteristics as "the ability to experience, to remember the past, and
to envisage the future, to communicate, and even to laugh at one’s self."1 Since the unborn can perform none of these activities in a conscious
and intentional way, Ms. Bok would exclude them from the category of living
human beings. Here we see the ultimate homicidal consequence of the
Cartesian reduction of man to mind. What Ms. Bok forgets or does not know,
is that even though the unborn child cannot perform any of the above
mentioned activities actually, all living unborn human children have
the potential to perform all of these activities by the very fact
that they are creatures of the human type.
Of course, as Ms. Bok has shown, those who would justify
the taking of an innocent human life, must, in some way, render the being
whose elimination they are trying to justify nonhuman. They must, also, in a
certain way, remove the unborn child from the category of the living since,
as all those with a basic insight into the structure of nature know, and as
Aristotle well understood, there is no living being which is not of a
specific type, a member of a definite species. By reducing man to a few of
his higher functions, like "the ability to laugh at oneself," the
pro-abortionists attempt to obfuscate the fact that a being does not need to
manifest all of the potential activities of a species in order
to be a true and living member of that species. Moreover, for our purposes,
we should consider the fact that the more radical advocates of legalized
abortion, Ms. Bok being one of them, attempt to completely disengage the
conscious life of man from the biological conditions of that conscious life.
Ultimately, the unborn can be eliminated because man is not a body!
If the unborn child, being as yet unable to actualize the
higher capacities of a man, is not properly placed within the categories of
"living" and "human," it will be the evaluative consciousness of those who
do manifest these aspects of human life who will decide on the fate of the
nondescript "stuff" to which the unborn child has been reduced. In the
decision by which they upheld the constitutionality of Roe v. Wade, the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Casey v. Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania stated
that to determine for a woman the meaning and nature of the life in her womb
would be to transgress upon her right to "self-definition" (i.e., her
ability to determine for herself the meaning and nature of her own life).
Here, again, you have the self-defining, ungrounded human consciousness
"forgetting" the obvious fact that the activity of and within the body is
not only an activity of the person, but also an active reality which is
surrounded and penetrated with moral implications and the claims of justice.
It is truly a sign of how unhinged we are in the constitutional and
political sphere that the reality of the concrete and the perceptible should
be sacrificed for ambiguous and ethereal talk about autonomous,
world-determining human intentionality. It is for such reasons that
thousands of unborn children a year are reduced to a commodity by partial
birth abortions. What was human and living was always understood to be
intrinsically valuable and, hence, irreducible to a monetary sum and
incapable of being rendered a mere useful instrument for the advancement of
another person’s intrinsic good. This is, of course, one of the reasons why
both slavery and human sacrifice are contrary to the Natural Law.
Since the biological status of the pre-born human being
plays no role in this evaluation of his or her humanness, it is not
surprising that the very same sort of argumentation is presented as a
justification for infanticide. In this regard, we see Ms. Bok stating the
following:
A set of later distinctions cluster around the process
of birth itself. This is the moment when life begins, according to some
religious traditions, and the point at which "persons" are fully
recognized in law, according to the Supreme Court. The first breaths taken
by newborn babies have been invested with immense symbolic meaning since
the earliest gropings towards understanding what it means to be alive and
human. And the rituals of acceptance of babies and children have often
served to define humanity to the point where the baby could be killed if
it were not named or declared acceptable by the elders of the community or
by the head of the household, either at birth or in infancy.2
Being acceptable or being named does not change one’s
species nor does it invest a being with membership in a species. Using
similar criteria, F. Raymond Marks, an attorney with the Childhood and
Government Project at Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at
Berkeley (ironic in a way, since it was the Irish philosopher George
Berkeley who attempted to argue that matter does not exist and that all that
exists are minds and ideas thought by minds), has gone so far as to advise a
social policy which would withhold legal "personhood" (again, note the
disincarnate and abstruse terminology used here) from...:
...certain carefully defined categories of high-risk
infants until a clear diagnosis and prognosis can be made concerning them
and until their parents have made an informed decision whether or not they
want to keep and nurture these infants.3
Here we see how, the biological reality being denied or
rendered "meaningless," the significance of the primarily spatial
distinction between being inside or outside the womb ceases to have any
philosophical or legal significance.
Death: A New Definition
In order to render the unborn or the "unwanted" infant
without essence or legal claim, the merchants of death had to redefine what
it means to be a "living human being," in order to justify the medical
elimination of the "useless" sick or their commercialization through
trafficking in vital organs, they have redefined human "death." In this
regard, we are not merely referring to the deprivation of ordinary means of
sustenance (i.e., nutrition and hydration) by doctors who decide that
a comatose or incapacitated person does not have a sufficiently high
"quality of life," not to mention the terminally ill whose regular vital
functions have broken down and these are sustained merely through the use of
extraordinary technological means. What technology has provided for in our
day is something much more than "mere" euthanasia or the legitimate
"unplugging" of artificial and extraordinary means of sustaining a life
which, if left on its own, would die a natural death. This new technological
innovation allows a patient who, under the old "total death" definition of
death, would still be considered alive, to be considered "dead" even while
his vital organs are being "harvested" precisely on account of the fact that
they are alive.4
Under the old definition, a formerly living being was
declared "dead" when he exhibited signs of what the ethicists are now
calling "total death," or the lack of any spontaneous activity and the
complete absence of cerebral, cardiac, and pulmonary activity and of spinal
reflex function.5 This quite accurate definition and readily determinable
state, it can be assessed clinically by examination at anyone’s bedside, is
being replaced by "irreversible brain damage." The reason that this new
definition is even viable, is on account of the fact that the higher
cortical centers of the brain (e.g., those centers essential to
purposeful movement, speech, and consciousness), as opposed to the brain
stem which is concerned with vegetative functions such as heart regulation,
circulation, and respiration, are more sensitive to oxygen lack. It is
therefore biologically possible for irreparable damage to occur to the
cerebral cortex and other higher centers, while the brain stem structures
remain relatively intact and functioning, maintaining heart rate, blood
pressure, circulation, and respiration. In addition, the spinal cord and
nerves will continue to function in a reflex fashion, in response to
incoming stimuli.6
It is from such persons in such an "irreversible" state
of brain damage that vital organs are being harvested. As Professor Hans
Jonas has stated, one of the medical and commercial purposes for changing
the definition of death from one of "total death" to one of "irreversible
brain damage," is to advance the moment when a patient can be declared
"dead." This declaration, and that is all that it is, is the necessary
medical and legal condition which needs to be fulfilled before the fully
living organs of the brain damaged (e.g., heart, kidney, liver)
patient can be "harvested" for the good of one who is "truly alive." Here we
find manifested the universal triumph of the commercial mentality, along
with the instrumentalization of man. Descartes’ reduction of man to mind and
consciousness continues, each and every year, to yield more terrible fruit.7
Soul: The Catholic Definition
When we hear that "soul" or anima in Latin is the
principle distinguishing all living from all nonliving things, we tend to
react in a way conditioned by the same reductionism which we find operative
in the modernistic thought of Rene Descartes. Whereas, Descartes reduced man
to calculating mind, we tend to limit the term "soul" to those beings which
possess rational souls, that is, to man (Angels of course are intellectual
substances without souls). Such is not the mind of the great Aristotelian-Thomistic
tradition, however. For Aristotle and, subsequently, for St. Thomas Aquinas,
soul, anima in Latin and psyche in Greek, all living beings
possess a soul, which can also be termed the principle of animation, that
which is the internal source of all of a living being’s activity.
The philosophia perennis is not stating, in
this regard, that all souls are of the same nature, even though they all
share certain characteristics and serve a somewhat similar function in the
existence of all living beings. I would maintain that to understand and
affirm the true nature of soul as it has been identified by Aristotle and
St. Thomas is to solve most of the bioethical controversies which we are
encountering in our own day and will be encountering in the future. It is
also to grasp hold of the philosophical component of much of the Catholic
Church’s teaching on ethical matters relating to human life.
The first thing which must be done in order for us to
gain a better understanding of the reality of soul is to make a distinction.
This distinction is one between spiritual souls and material souls. Only
human beings, along with the Incarnate Word, have human souls. These souls,
even though they are what give life to the body, do not corrupt when the
body corrupts, nor are they existentially absolutely dependent on the body (i.e.,
they can exist without the body). All other living things have souls which
are material principles and, hence, corrupt when the bodily organism dies.
It is precisely the spirituality of the human soul which gives it the
independence it has from the body. Those principles of animation which are
not spiritual do not have any type of independence whatsoever.
This being said, it is now important that we consider
those characteristics which all souls share, characteristics which
they all possess as souls. The first thing which we must say about the soul
is that the soul is the
substantial form of the
body. This is not only a true philosophical principle, it is
also a defined doctrine of the Church, even though it is only theologically
and doctrinally significant when it refers to the human soul. This doctrine
is referred to as hylomorphism, from the Greek words hyle
(matter) and morphe (form) or the body as matter enformed by the
soul.
What does it mean that the soul is the "substantial form"
of the body? It means that the soul gives to a living being its
substantial being, it makes a thing be an entity. The soul does not
merely give a living being certain accidental qualities, such as
brown skin or blue eyes. Rather, it makes the being an existing, living
being or a certain type or species. It marks out a being for what it
is. Here we see the foundational aspect of soul. It is called by Aristotle
the first act of the living organic body. Upon this "first act" all
secondary acts of the living being depend (e.g., respiration,
hydration, cardiac activity, local motion, and sense perception). The
secondary acts of a living being cannot exist, unless they are grounded in
the soul as the first vivifying act of the organic body. The soul is the
internal source and wellspring of life. It is the soul which enables a
living being to move and act on its own, unlike nonliving things which must
be moved by another. That living things are self-moved is one
of the characteristics which distinguish living from nonliving things.
The soul is also the cause of the unity possessed by
living beings. It is the soul which makes a being truly "organic." To be an
organic being is essentially different than being a nonorganic being. Both
organic beings and nonorganic beings have parts; however, the parts of
organic beings, the organs, are not merely grouped together in an aggregate
of intrinsically unrelated components as is the case for nonorganic beings.
Rather, the parts of an organic being have an intrinsic ordering towards
each other and the whole organism. This intrinsic ordering is on account of
the ordering of the activity of each part to the overall maintenance of the
whole. A part of an organic being is not truly what it is if it is separated
from the dynamic activity of the unified organism. A heart is without
purpose if it is not the heart of a living being. We only understand the
rationale of the part when we understand the nature of the whole. Since all
the organs or parts of an organism are directed towards the same end,
maintaining the organism as a whole, we can therefore speak of them as
intrinsically related to each other. This internal ordering of parts to a
unified end is complemented by an ordering of the unified organism itself to
a single natural end of all of its activity. The soul both orders the parts
to the whole and the whole to the goal!
As has been mentioned at the beginning of this essay,
modern science attempts to understand and control the natural realities
which it studies by delineating a being into its component parts (e.g.,
chemistry and biology) or by reducing a being to one aspect of itself (e.g.,
physics). When it comes to living beings, however, we must recognize that
contrary to the belief of those who idolize modern empirical science, there
is an irreducible aspect of living things which renders them, in a very
significant way, beyond the intellectual reach of modern, mathematically
oriented science. What is this irreducible aspect? It is the life of
the thing itself. Even though biology may study living creatures, it cannot
study the life of those same creatures. As we have seen, life is either
there or it isn’t, it is a unity, and it is in act, always. Modern
quantitative science can know nothing of the soul, because the soul is not
quantifiable, even though it implicitly assumes its existence. It knows that
there is a radical difference between what is living and what is nonliving
and it knows, again implicitly, that there must be a principle which
accounts for the difference. The reason they know to study living things as
a category of beings is on account of the fact that they have experienced
life, both their own and that of other living things.
The above description of the general nature of soul
applies fully to the human soul. For the purposes of bioethical discussion,
it is important that the soul’s unification of the being as an individual,
living being of a particular type and species be emphasized. What attracted
St. Thomas the most to Aristotle’s hylomorphism was its emphasis on the
unity which is the human person. "Person" should not be reduced to the
intellectual, or spiritual, functions and activities of man. Since man has
an intellectual and, hence, spiritual soul (we know this for certain, since
we know he performs intellectual and spiritual acts) which is the source of
all the activities of the man, including those activities and functions
which are purely physical or at least relate primarily to the life of the
body (e.g., sensation and respiration), we can say that the whole
man is a rational being. All moral and legal strictures which apply to all
actions by which one man relates to another man, would apply in full between
men insofar as they are of the human type, that is, insofar as they possess
a human soul (i.e., insofar as they possess the "first act" of the
body). This is the case, whether any of those human beings are manifesting
certain "secondary acts" (i.e., intellectual acts) or not. There are
always some secondary acts which are manifested if the primary act of
the soul is still present.
Justice and the Claims of the Living
The implications for abortion, euthanasia, and
infanticide are profound. Insofar as "total death" has not yet occurred, a
man is still a man and must be treated as such. The reason is that he still
has a human soul which is animating his human body. That he is going through
one stage of his dynamic movement towards full development, or even though
he has ceased to actualize certain specific functions normally associated
with a human being, does not wrest him from the category of "human." If man
is still man, those other men who may, for whatever reason, have power over
his life must render to that life what is its due. Such is, and always has
been, the demand of justice. By failing to render to all men, born and
preborn, infant and adult, healthy and ill, genetically deficient or
genetically normal, what is their due, we trample on the sovereignty of God
Who has made and Who has rightful possession of the whole man, body and
soul. There is no telling how much the sovereign mind and will of God will
be challenged or ignored in man’s attempt to gain complete mastery over
nature. By our affirming the unity of man, of his body and soul, his mind
and will, his emotions and his passions, his life and his consciousness, we
prevent the reduction of man to a commodity which can be separated into
parts and sold or disposed of for monetary profit. By placing moral and,
hopefully, legal restrictions on the merchants of life and death, we
acknowledge the gift which is life.
Through the possession of life, we share in an imperfect
way, but in a very real way, in an attribute possessed perfectly by God.
Just as it is strange that we should "forget" the true nature of life, or
mistake it for what it is not, even though we have never known a moment when
we have not been living, so too is it strange that those who can hardly
determine completely the slightest event in our own lives, should forget
that it is in Him that we live and move and have our being. Let us return
soon to the wisdom of the ancients, who said that it is in wonder and the
fear of the Lord that all knowledge begins and ends.
FOOTNOTES |
- Sissela Bok, "Ethical Problems of Abortion" in Bioethics:
Basic Writings on the Key
Ethical Questions That Surround the
Major Biological Possibilities and
Problems, ed. Thomas Shannon (Ramsey, New Jersey: Paulist
Press, 1976), p.51.
- Ibid.
- A.R. Jonsen, "Critical Issues in Newborn Intensive Care" in
Bioethics, p.101.
- Cf. Applied Philosophy: Morals and
Metaphysics in Contemporary Debate,
eds. Donald Hill and Brenda Almond (New York: Routledge, 1991).
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- Hans Jonas, "Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects"
in Bioethics, p.257. Cf. Hans Jonas, "A Definition
of Irreversible Coma in the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of
Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain Death,"
Journal of the American Medical
Association, Vol. 205, No. 6 (August 5, 1968), pp.337-340.
- David Rutstein, "The Ethical Design of Human Experiments" in
Bioethics, p.265.
- Cf. George Smith II, The New Biology:
Law, Ethics, and Biotechnology (New
York: Plenum Press, 1989).
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