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Is smoking
marijuana a sin? What about taking drugs?
The old text
books [on moral theology] do not speak of this new problem of
the modern world. However, the immorality of drug abuse can be
clearly deduced from the principles which allow an evaluation of
the malice of alcohol abuse... 10-30-2012 |
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MEDICAL |
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MEDICAL
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Some people maintain that the
withdrawal of hydration and nutrition from Terri Schiavo († March 30, 2005) was
not immoral. Do they have any solid reason for affirming this?
Those who dare deny the necessity of hydration and nutrition
in those persons considered to be in a vegetative condition have done so on the
basis of one of two reasons. The first excuse is the subjective one of "quality
of life," which is all important for the humanist way of thinking. A person’s
life is to be considered as lacking in quality, unproductive, and not worth
living because of brain damage or mental retardation. It is no secret to anyone
that such a materialistic, pragmatic conception is directly opposed to the
sovereign right that God alone has over life and death, and consequently to the
fifth commandment.
The second reason that is given is that artificial nutrition
and hydration can be considered in certain circumstances (e.g., incurable
vegetative state) as extraordinary means, on account of the cost and effort
required, and consequently disproportionate to the benefit that can reasonably
be expected —the prolongation of life —and that consequently they would not be
obligatory in conscience.
The resolution of this question depends upon the clear
distinction between ordinary and extraordinary means. It was treated very
thoroughly by Fr. Iscara in the July 1997 issue of The Angelus, in which
he established that feeding and hydration are always ordinary means and
consequently obligatory in conscience, regardless of the condition of the
person. He there describes the liberal evolution of these concepts over the past
half century.
It is certainly true that if all admit the distinction
between ordinary and extraordinary means, nevertheless the judgment of which are
extraordinary and which are ordinary means has not in general been defined by
the Church. Moreover, this distinction is not absolute, nor identical in every
case, for a means might be ordinary for some people but extraordinary for
others, due to variable considerations such as excessive cost, pain and
discomfort, location and difficulty in using the means, danger of complications
and high chance of failure. However, traditionally, and rightly so, the
essential consideration is an objective one. An ordinary means is one that can
be procured by ordinary effort and diligence, whereas an extraordinary means
requires that effort which is out of the common order of things. A person who
does not follow the quality of life theory could consequently only allege that
hydration and nutrition were not obligatory by establishing that they are
extraordinary means on account of the great cost, effort and/or suffering
involved. This could certainly be said for the case of intravenous feeding, but
not for intragastric feeding, which is simple, uncomplicated and relatively
inexpensive. The withdrawal of such nutrition and hydration can consequently not
be considered as anything other than indirect euthanasia, a grave sin against
the fifth commandment.
Moreover, this whole question was resolved authoritatively by
Pope John Paul II in a discourse that he gave to the participants in the
International Congress on "Life-Sustaining Treatments and Vegetative State:
Scientific Advances and Ethical Dilemmas" (March 20, 2004). He there teaches
that the quality of life is irrelevant (§3). He states that it is irrelevant to
human dignity, which is true, but we would have preferred that he had pointed
out that it is irrelevant to the practice of charity and the observance of the
law of God.
However, his clearest statement concerns the use of the term
"ordinary means" with respect to nutrition and hydration. He states that, unlike
other medical treatments, nutrition and hydration are like nursing care: they
are always and necessarily an ordinary means, and they cannot be considered to
be an extraordinary means, no matter what they cost. Here is the text:
The sick person in a vegetative state, awaiting recovery or
a natural end, still has the right to basic health care (nutrition, hydration,
cleanliness, warmth, etc.) and to the prevention of complications
related to his confinement to bed…. I should like particularly to underline how
the administration of water and food, even when provided by artificial means,
always represents a natural means of preserving life, not a medical act. Its
use, furthermore, should be considered, in principle, ordinary and
proportionate, and as such morally obligatory, insofar as and until it is seen
to have attained its proper finality, which in the present case consists in
providing nourishment to the patient and alleviation of his suffering…. The
evaluation of probabilities, founded on waning hopes for recovery when the
vegetative state is prolonged beyond a year, cannot ethically justify the
cessation or interruption of minimal care for the patient, including nutrition
and hydration. Death by starvation or dehydration is, in fact, the only
possible outcome as a result of their withdrawal. In this sense it ends up
becoming, if done knowingly and willingly, true and proper euthanasia by
omission (ibid., §4).
Although not a formal definition, this is a statement of the
Church’s highest authority, clarifying a question of morals. It must be
accepted, given that it is in line with Catholic Tradition. Consequently, there
can no longer be any doubt as to whether or not hydration and nutrition
constitute ordinary means. They are always ordinary, and they are always
obligatory in just the same way as nursing care is obligatory, regardless of how
much it might cost to hire nursing staff. The outrage that Catholics in the U.S.
have felt and expressed concerning the apparent inability of the executive and
judicial powers to stop this tragic euthanasia is perfectly justified, and any
person who does not feel this way needs to return to the Gospel of St. Matthew
and ask for charity: "For I was hungry and you gave me not to eat: I was
thirsty, and you gave me not to drink.…Amen I say to you, as long as you did it
not to one of these least, neither did you do it to me" (Mt. 25:42,45).
[Answered by Fr. Peter Scott] |
Can cloned human babies be used for
experiments and for growing spare parts, to help others?
This is what is called therapeutic cloning, as distinct from
reproductive cloning. The clones are to be destroyed, and the living cells
recuperated, within a certain number of days, usually 15.
The principle here is very simple. The end does not justify
the means. It is never permitted to do something evil, that good might come from
it, for the goodness or evil of a human act is defined by its end, more than by
anything else.
Clones are true human beings, for they have an immortal soul,
just as does a test-tube baby. The human soul is inseparable from the life of a
human being, so that whenever the body is organized in such a way to have human
life, the soul is present, as the principle of this life. Despite the immorality
of the way in which test-tube babies are conceived, and the way in which genetic
material of a clone is introduced into the nucleus of the ovum, once this has
been done and there is human life, there is a human soul. If the cloned embryo
is then frozen, the soul is not frozen. It is just that the processes of life
are temporarily interrupted, ready to start again when the temperature
environment becomes suitable. A frozen embryo, cloned or otherwise, must
consequently be considered alive.
The therapeutic use of human clones for stem cell research or
to provide a source of stem cells to regenerate organs in other people requires
that the cloned embryo be killed. It is consequently manifestly immoral, and
opposed to the natural law and to the fifth commandment. It consequently
behooves all Catholics to stand up against this grave insult to Almighty God,
and to do all in our power to prevent this great evil of man attempting to raise
himself to take God’s place.
In principle, a person who actively participates in such
cloning procedures incurs the same penalty as one who participates in the
procuring of an abortion, namely an excommunication (canon 2350, §1 in the 1917
Code of Canon Law and canon 1398 in the 1983 Code of Canon Law).
It is, however, true that a person could maintain there is a difference between
an abortion and the killing of a cloned baby, inasmuch as the clone is in a
laboratory, not an infant developing in his mother’s womb. In such cases, the
Church provides for the interpretation of her penal laws in the most favorable
manner (canon 19 in the 1917 Code and Ccanon 18 in the 1983 Code),
so that in case of doubt the excommunication would not be incurred.
[Answered by Fr. Peter Scott] |
Is it
licit to allow one’s children to be vaccinated for Rubella?
Answer: There are two particular problems involved with the Rubella vaccination.
The first is that there are only two vaccines presently available, and both are
derived from fetal cell lines. The second is that the frequency and danger of
Congenital Rubella Syndrome, contracted by the fetuses of pregnant mothers
infected with the virus, is such as to have brought about a public health policy
of universal vaccination for the good of society as a whole. In order to answer
these questions, the following principles have to be considered.
Licitness of vaccines derived from fetal cell lines
There is no doubt that it is illicit to prepare, promote, or market vaccines
fabricated by the use of cell cultures from aborted babies, since such
deliberate use of abortion by-products is a formal cooperation in the abortion.
However, the present question is much more delicate. It is whether or not it is
permissible to use such vaccines produced and marketed by someone else. If there
are alternatives, we manifestly must protest the killing of the innocent by
using the alternatives. However, what if they are the only ones that are readily
available, as in the case of rubella? Can the principles of double effect be
applied? Here are the principles: when only a good effect is directly willed,
and a bad effect is simply permitted, but not directly willed in itself, it is
permissible, so long as the good effect does not come from the bad effect, and
so long as there is a proportionate reason to tolerate the bad effect. In such
an instance, it is possible to permit an evil, not directly willed in itself,
and this is called the indirect voluntary.
The good effect in this case is the immunization against the infectious disease.
The bad effect is the abortion, the killing of the innocent. Here one could
argue that the person who seeks the vaccination does not will the abortion, but
simply uses the cells that are obtained as a by-product or indirect consequence
of it. After all, the abortion was not performed in order to produce fetal cells
to produce a vaccine, but for entirely different reasons. However, although the
abortion is only indirectly voluntary, nevertheless the Catholic sense tells the
faithful that they ought never to use the by-products of abortions for any
reason at all, for by so doing they promote the mass murder of the innocent
which is destroying modern society and all sense of morality. There must always
be a proportionate reason to use the indirect voluntary, that is to permit
something evil which is not directly willed. Here the reasonable gain obtained
by the use of the double effect is not in any way proportionate to the horrible
evil of abortion and the scandal of using them is immense.
If a person is not aware of the fact that fetal cells are being used in the
culture of the vaccines that he or she is giving to his children, then clearly
there is no moral fault involved. However, if he is aware of this, then he is
morally obliged to refuse such vaccinations on principle, until such time as
they can be obtained from cultures which are morally licit. Moreover, it is not
permissible to remain in wilful ignorance on such a question. If there is a
positive reason to suspect that fetal cells are indeed involved in the
production of the vaccine, then a person is morally obliged to clarify the
matter, and find out if this is indeed true or not.
Illicit vaccines the only ones available
However, the reality is more complicated yet. It is clear that if a Catholic has
a choice in the matter, he is bound to choose a vaccine that is not derived from
a fetal cell line, for he does not want any kind of participation in the crime
of a voluntary abortion, even one done fifty years ago. However, what is he to
do if he seems to have no choice. This question has become a very difficult one
from the fact that several vaccines are not available in any other form but that
derived from an aborted fetus, in particular rubella (contained in the MMR),
Chicken Pox (Varicella) and Hepatitis A. Is one morally obliged to forgo such a
vaccination, otherwise necessary for health? Also, if one is bound by civil law
to receive or give such a vaccination, must one refuse to accept such a
vaccination for one’s children under pain of sin?
This question was well treated by the Pontifical Academy for Life, in a document
approved by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, and dated June 9,
2005. This document makes the necessary distinctions. The first is between
formal and material cooperation. It is never permitted, for any reason, to
cooperate formally in another’s immoral action, in this case the abortion, for
the evil would be directly willed. Examples of formal cooperation include the
staff who willingly help with the abortion or the original researchers who
requested the aborted fetal tissue for their research, or the drug companies who
promoted it. However, those who simply use the vaccines as by products of the
cell line do not necessarily cooperate formally in the abortion.
Material cooperation exists when a person shares in some way in an evil action,
for example by taking advantage of its consequences, but without sharing its
evil intent. Examples of material cooperation include the staff who prepare the
operating theatre or the nurse who prepares the patient, neither of them knowing
the exact nature of the procedure to be performed. Material cooperation can be
immoral, if done without sufficient reason. However, it can also be permissible
and moral, for the will does not directly consent to the evil, for it is a case
of the indirect voluntary or double effect. A typical situation would be the cab
driver who drops off a person at a certain address, not knowing that it is a
house of ill repute, or why he was going there. However, for material
cooperation to be permissible, it must be done for a good and proportionately
grave reason, in proportion to the gravity of the evil and the proximity of
cooperation in it.
The principles of double effect must be applied, namely provided that the good
effect (in this case the use of the vaccine) does not come directly from the bad
effect (the murder of the innocent), but is simply a by product of this immoral
act. Moreover, the material cooperation can be immediate, as in the nurse who
takes care of the patient before or after the procedure, or it can be mediate
because not directly involved in the abortion. Moreover this mediate material
cooperation can also be very remote, and far removed from the abortion itself,
as in the case of those who use vaccines that were developed from a fetal cell
line some fifty years old. In cases of remote material cooperation, it is not
such a grave reason that is required for there to be a proportionate reason for
the material cooperation. This is not to deny the very grave evil of abortion,
but simply to recognize that the material cooperation, is extremely far removed
from the abortion done so many years ago. The absence of any other vaccine and
the need of the vaccine for one’s health would be sufficient reason. The reason
for this given by the above mentioned document is that in this case, given the
remoteness of the material cooperation, “the duty to avoid passive material
cooperation is not obligatory if there is grave inconvenience”. Danger to health
or problems with civil law constitute such a grave inconvenience, which is a
proportionate reason to permit such far removed passive, material cooperation,
as the document states.
This being said, the development of vaccines from fetal cell lines is gravely
immoral, and we have the duty to actively oppose it as much as we can, in order
to avoid any formal cooperation. This is how the above mentioned document
describes this grave obligation:
Therefore, doctors and fathers of families have a duty to take recourse to
alternative vaccines (if they exist), putting pressure on the political
authorities and health systems so that other vaccines without moral problems
become available…They should oppose by all means…the vaccines which do not yet
have morally acceptable alternatives, creating pressure so that alternative
vaccines are prepared, which are not connected with the abortion of a human
fetus…
Despite this, it would be excessive and wrong to deny that the material
cooperation in the use of such vaccines is very remote, so that where there is
no alternative to such vaccines, and where the health of children or of the
community at large requires it, it is not only permissible to use such vaccines
for which there is no alternative, but sometimes even obligatory. This would be
the case of a woman planning to marry, who had never been vaccinated against
rubella and who did not have any natural immunity. It would be a moral
obligation to receive the vaccine, even derived from fetal cell line, in order
to protect her own unborn children from the possibility of abortion or of
serious deformities due to infection with the rubella virus. Her duty to protect
her unborn children is the grave reason that permits and, where there is no
alternative even makes obligatory, the very remote mediate material cooperation
involved.
Obligatory for the good of society?
The final question that needs to be considered is whether this Rubella vaccine,
obligatory for women contemplating marriage who have never developed a natural
immunity to German Measles, should be obligatory also for all children. The
argument in favor of it is that universal immunization against rubella is the
only way to protect against Congenital Rubella Syndrome, and consequently
necessary for the good of society. The argument is that unvaccinated children
can be carriers of the virus, with which pregnant women can later become
infected. This argument is accepted by the above-mentioned article of the
Pontifical Academy for Life, which has this to say in footnote 15: ”In this
case, the parents who did not accept the vaccination of their own children
become responsible for the malformations in question, and for the subsequent
abortion of foetuses, when they have been discovered to be malformed”.
However, there are good reasons to question this particular conclusion. If it is
true that quasi-universal vaccinations against diseases such as Tuberculosis and
Polio were able to effectively eliminate these very serious diseases from the
developed world, the same does not necessarily apply to Rubella. The first
difference is that, unlike these life-threatening diseases, it is in itself a
minor and harmless disease. The second difference is that the natural immunity
developed by infection with the virus as a child is much more effective than the
artificial immunity created by vaccination. The third difference is that despite
decades of vaccination, German Measles is still endemic in the community. The
fourth reason is that there is a very easy way for the portion of the community
in danger to be protected: women should seek the vaccine before marriage. If
they refuse to do so, the rest of the community cannot be held responsible.
Furthermore, it would be preposterous to argue that because some young girls
decide to perform immoral acts that expose them to falling pregnant before
marriage, then the whole community is bound to be vaccinated. This would be to
justify immoral behaviour and make it the rule of our action. Fifthly, rubella
is in itself an immoral vaccination, and consequently only permissible in cases
of real need – women exposed to pregnancy who have not had contact with the
Rubella virus itself. Sixthly, why should parents expose their children
(especially boys) to the possible complications of vaccinations, when there is
no benefit for the children themselves, and when in fact it would be much
better, especially for girls, to have contact with the virus while they are
young.
In conclusion, in the case of routine vaccine of children with MMR (Measles,
Mumps and Rubella, of which only Rubella is derived from fetal cell lines) there
is certainly no obligation to have the vaccine, since it is not strictly
necessary, either for one’s own health or for that of the community. If it is
desired, then it would certainly be best to request the Measles and Mumps
portions separately from the Rubella, thus making a statement of moral
principle, and this should be done whenever possible. Nevertheless, if the MMR
combination is the only one offered, and if parents have good reason to
administer this vaccine (even if it be only the good of society) or if it is
considered to be obligatory by public health authorities or for school entrance,
then they are not to be troubled in conscience by allowing it to be administered
to their children. However, since there are many good reasons to refuse the
Rubella vaccine altogether for children, and since it is certainly preferable to
make a stand on moral principle, no parent is to be troubled or disturbed
because he decides that his children are not to receive the Rubella or the MMR
on account of the immoral origin of the Rubella portion of the vaccine. It is
perfectly licit in such a case to insist on an exemption of conscience on the
grounds of religion. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]
|
Why is sterilization immoral,
and is a reversal procedure ever necessary?
Sterilization is a particular form of artificial birth
control, characterized by the additional evil intent that the frustration of the
marriage act is meant to be permanent. It is surgically accomplished in a man by
a double vasectomy, preventing the sperm from having access to the prostate and
the seminal fluids. It is done in a woman by tubal ligation, preventing the
fertilization of the ovum by the sperm from taking place.
It is a mortal sin, and is forbidden by the Church’s law
precisely because it is against the natural law. The natural law is man’s
participation in the Eternal law of God, and through it every rational creature
recognizes in his conscience his own goal and the right means to attain it. It
is a secondary but clear precept of the natural law that "the primary end of
matrimony is the procreation and the education of children," as is defined
by canon 1013, §1 of the 1917 Code of Canon Law. Sins that frustrate this
end, inscribed by the natural law in every man’s conscience, are called sins
against nature because they are a willful perversion of the order of nature.
Pope Pius XI has this to say
about all such forms of artificial birth control:
No reason, however grave, may be put forward by which
anything intrinsically against nature may become conformable to nature and
morally good. Since, therefore, the conjugal act is destined primarily by
nature for the begetting of children, those who in exercising it deliberately
frustrate its natural power and purpose sin against nature and commit a deed
which is shameful and intrinsically vicious. Small wonder, therefore, if Holy
Writ bears witness that the Divine Majesty regards with greatest detestation
this horrible crime and at times has punished it with death …the Catholic
Church …through Our mouth proclaims anew: any use whatsoever of matrimony
exercised in such a way that the act is deliberately frustrated in its natural
power to generate life is an offense against the law of God and of nature, and
those who indulge in such are branded with the guilt of a grave sin (Casti
Connubii, Pauline Books, pp.28, 29).
All artificial birth control is
consequently against the Church’s positive law, as well as against the natural
law.
Pope Pius XI has this to say in
particular about sterilization:
"Furthermore Christian doctrine establishes, and the
light of human reason makes it most clear, that private individuals have no
power over the members of their bodies than that which pertains to their
natural ends; and they are not free to destroy or mutilate their members, or
in any other way render themselves unfit for their natural functions, except
when no other provision can be made for the good of the whole body" (ibid.
pp.35, 36).
The theologians (e.g., Prummer, Manuale
theologiae moralis, II, §6) further explain that a person does not have an
absolute dominion or right over his body. He simply has control over its use, as
a steward over his master’s property. He must consequently always use it
according to the will and law of God. Sterilization is a form of
self-mutilation, like the cutting off of a hand, and is a grave insult to God
who gave the faculty to engender children.
The perversion involved in sterilization is that it is a
procedure which is never done for the health of the whole body, but only and
simply to frustrate procreation. Even in the case of a mother who already has
many children, and who is too sick to bear any further children, sterilization (i.e.,
tubal ligation) is immoral and a mortal sin, for it is only through the
frustration of the natural end of the marriage act that her health is helped,
that is only through a perversion of nature. The end does not justify the means.
One cannot do evil that good may come of it. In such an instance a couple must
practice abstinence.
It may be objected that sterilization is not such a grave
sin as it once was, since this aspect of the natural law has been obscured. It
cannot be denied that the modern personalist vision of marriage, namely that it
is primarily "ordered towards the good of the spouses" (canon 1055, §1of
the 1983 Code of Canon Law; Catechism of the Catholic Church,
§1601) and only thereafter towards the procreation and education of children,
has caused a radical and unnatural change in the manner of thinking. According
to this new conception artificial birth control, and in particular
sterilization, are seen to be a right, instead of a radical perversion of God’s
plan, and the method of periodic continence is even praised. Although it is true
that sterilization is still technically condemned by the post-Conciliar church (CCC,
§2297), it is only in passing, and in an ineffective and watered down manner.
The consequence is obvious. Catholics everywhere have lost the sense of the
moral law, and feel that they have a "right" to sterilization if they judge that
they have had enough children, and it is for their personal good to stop now.
Although this may diminish somewhat the subjective culpability of the couples
involved, it does not change the fact that these procedures are an objective
mortal sin and a perversion.
The question of reversal frequently arises, especially in
the cases of couples who have become traditional after having had such a
sterilization procedure performed. Fortunately, it is frequently possible to
reverse such sterilization procedures. The success of such procedures will
depend upon the methods originally used, and upon the time that has passed since
the original operation. A simple ligation (e.g., of the fallopian tube or
of the vas deferens) can be repaired. However, the tubes can be destroyed
in the procedure, so that reversal is much more difficult. The passage of ten or
more years makes the success rate markedly lower, particular with vasectomy
reversal, on account of the slow down in sperm production which is the
consequence of the vasectomy, and of the build up of antibodies against the
sperm, due to blowout of the epididymis.
Clearly, however, there is only
one way to remedy the defect caused by sterilization, only one means to make
restitution for the offense caused to Almighty God; it is the reversal of the
procedure. Any Catholic couple that is still of child-bearing age, who would
maintain that they are sorry for having the procedure done, but would refuse to
have it reversed, would be manifestly guilty of hypocrisy, and would have no
firm purpose of amendment. This is why the confessor will necessarily impose as
a condition to the granting of absolution that the penitent accept to have the
reversal of the sterilization performed, if it is at all possible. If the
urologist or the gynecologist insists that it is not possible to reverse the
sterilization, or if he maintains that the chances of success in this particular
case are extremely low, then the couple is no longer bound in conscience to have
the reversal done. Since reversal procedures are expensive and generally not
covered by health insurance, it often happens that a couple does not have the
funds for a reversal procedure. They should do all in their power to borrow or
save up the funds to have the reversal done, but if this truly is not possible
and for as long as it is not possible, then they are not bound to do what they
cannot do.
Can a couple, of whom one is
sterilized, request and render the marriage debt? If it is through no fault of
their own that the reversal cannot be done, or if they have the intention to
have the reversal performed as soon as it is possible, then it is permissible
for both parties to request and render the marriage debt, after having
accomplished a suitable penance and made reparation for any scandal that they
have caused. A guilty party who would refuse to have the reversal procedure
performed (presuming that it is possible), would lose his right to request the
marriage debt, and would have to be refused absolution if he did.
However, it often happens that an
innocent party never consented to his or her spouse’s sterilization procedure.
Again Pope Pius XI gives us the principle to know what to do:
Holy Church knows well that not infrequently one of
the parties is sinned against rather than sinning, when for a grave cause he
or she reluctantly allows the perversion of the right order. In such a case,
there is no sin, provided that, mindful of the law of charity, he or she does
not neglect to seek to dissuade and to deter the partner from sin (ibid,
p. 30).
Consequently, it is permissible
for the innocent party to request or render the marriage debt to his or her
sterilized spouse, in order that the secondary purposes of marriage be
fulfilled, namely mutual help and affection and the calming of the
concupiscence.
A further objection is made that the vasectomized man is
technically permanently impotent, being unable to provide sperm, and that
consequently he cannot enter marriage and has no right to the marriage act if he
is married, since he will never be able to fully accomplish it. This was the
opinion of the older moral theologians, but theologians from the first half of
the 20th century taught that the marriage act is substantially complete even
without true sperm, since the other seminal fluids are present and suffice for
the accomplishment of the secondary end of marriage (Bouscaren & Ellis, Canon
Law, 1946, p.470). This opinion was confirmed by decree of the Sacred
Congregation for the Faith dated May 13, 1977. Consequently, if a reversal
procedure should prove impossible, the vasectomized man does not lose the right
to the marriage debt. [Answered by Fr.
Peter R. Scott]
|
Some physicians use the text of
Pope John Paul II’s Address to International Congress on Transplants,
dated August 29, 2000 to justify "cadaveric" organ
transplantation. Can we accept this?
"Cadaveric"
transplantation is a misnomer, and is used to describe the removal organs from a
person who has been declared brain dead, but who is being kept alive by
artificial means.
Note that the pope’s
address is not a statement of the Church’s Magisterium , and that it makes no
definitions or clear statements on Faith or morality. I will pass over the
humanistic and naturalistic tone of this discourse, which speaks of the dignity
of the human person, but not of the salvation of souls. I would, however, like
to bring up the crucial statement in this document, which the pope uses to
justify his personal opinion that it is licit to harvest organs from brain dead
people, who are being alive by artificial means, in order to treat medical
conditions by transplantation. This statement is this: "the criterion
adopted in more recent times for ascertaining the fact of death, namely the
complete and irreversible cessation of all brain activity, if rigorously
applied, does not seem to conflict with the essential elements of a sounds
anthropology." (§5)
The pope’s very hesitant
statement is quite simply wrong. The Church teaches that reason can prove with
certitude the spirituality and the immortality of the human soul (Ds 2766
and 2812). This means that the soul is not bound to any organ of the body,
including the brain. The soul is not dead or absent just because the brain is
incapable of functioning, short of a miracle. Death is in fact the separation of
the soul from the body. As the pope himself correctly points out, the precise
moment of death "is an event which no scientific technique or empirical
method can identify directly" (§4). It is for this reason that a
priest can conditionally administer the sacrament of Extreme Unction for up to
an hour after a person has been medically declared dead.
The pope’s argument is that we
can accept the neurological criteria of death have replaced the
cardio-respiratory criteria, namely the cessation of heart and lung activity for
a period of time beyond which it is no longer possible to revive them. It is
true that the neurological criteria give the moral certitude that the person
will die when the cardio-respiratory life support systems are removed. However,
they give absolutely no certitude that the person is already dead, in the true
sense of separation of soul and body. Moral certitude of this is only possible
when corruption takes place, as sure proof that human life is no longer present
in the corpse. However, as long as respiration and cardiac function are
maintained, albeit artificially, the tissues and cells of the body will
certainly stay alive and nourished, and the body remains one organism, with one
being, that is to say one soul. Corruption is the only sure sign that the unity
of the being is lost, and that consequently the immortal soul is separated from
the body. Once corruption sets in and death is certain, it is certainly
permissible to use organs for experimental and other uses, provided that there
is a proportionally grave reason. However, since corruption involves a
disintegration of the tissues and organs, they cannot then be used for
transplantation purposes.
How can it be said that with
certitude, that the human soul is no longer present in an apparently live body
whose brain is dead? And if the human soul is in all probability present, how
can the removal of organs necessary for life be justified? The moral certitude
that the brain dead person will die in any case is irrelevant. He is presently,
to all appearances and in all likelihood still alive, and the removal of organs
necessary for life could be the direct cause of his death? Surely to be
responsible for this is a sin against the fifth commandment. Surely man cannot
claim this right to kill another person simply because of the benefit that could
accrue to a third person. This is utilitarianism, considering man as a means to
an end.
Consequently, the medical
diagnosis of brain death can not be considered as giving the medical profession
the right to declare a person as dead quite simply. Furthermore, it is not
permissible to accept organs necessary for life, such as the heart, lung, or
liver, removed from a person in such a state. It is consequently my opinion that
the present day practice of "cadaveric" transplantation is
immoral and illicit, and it is not permitted for a Catholic to authorize his or
another’s donation or even to accept organs harvested in this way. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]
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Does the Church approve of
surgery for an ectopic pregnancy?
It is never permitted to directly kill an infant (or any
other person for that matter, with the exception of self defense, just war and
capital punishment), and so consequently, it is immoral to perform an abortion
in the case of an ectopic pregnancy, even to save the life of the mother. This
is immoral, whether it is done surgically or chemically. There are now available
medications (such as methotrexate, or just recently RU-486) that are commonly
used for tubular pregnancies, and that directly cause the living fetus to be
aborted. This is always immoral.
However, if it can be established
that the fetus is already dead (by ultrasound examination, for example), then
clearly the surgical removal of the already dead fetus for the health of the
mother is entirely permissible.
The difficulty arises when the fetus is still alive. The
mother’s life is endangered through internal hemorrhage at that time. The
moral theologians hold different opinions as to whether it is permissible to
intervene surgically to remove the ectopic pregnancy before the death of the
foetus. Some say that surgical intervention directly kills the foetus, which is
immoral. Others say that it is not direct killing at all, but it is the removing
of a mass of tissue (including the placenta) which has fixed itself in the wrong
place (the fallopian tube instead of the uterus), in such a way as to cause a
tumor invading the mother’s fallopian tube, rather like a malignant tumor.
Just as it is possible to operate on a tumor of the mother, (e.g., in
treatment of uterine cancer) even if as a consequence and indirectly the child
will die, so also it is moral, they say, to surgically remove this abnormal mass
of tissue, which contains the fetus. It is an indirect and unfortunate, though
necessary, consequence that the fetus will die, but this is not willed in
itself.
The principle used in this second opinion is the
application of the principle of double effect, or the indirect voluntary. This
is moral, provided that the bad effect, in this case the death of the unborn
child is not directly willed in itself, and that there is a proportionate reason
(such as saving the life of the mother), and that the good effect, namely saving
the mother’s life does not directly come from the bad effect, the death of the
child. The understanding of this solution depends upon the grasping of the
gravity of the proportionate reason. The fetus that lodges in the fallopian tube
cannot survive in any case, and if the mother is not treated she may very well
hemorrhage to death, or be observed in hospital for several weeks, and her
fallopian tubes can be so damaged by the ectopic pregnancy left untreated that
she might never be able to conceive again.
Since there are opinions on both
sides of this question, both can be safely followed in conscience. Consequently,
it is permissible to have surgery, provided that it is not a direct abortion,
but the removal of invasive tissue, but it is never permissible to take
medications to kill the live fetus. [Answered by
Fr. Peter R.
Scott]
|
Is it wrong to be an organ donor?
There are some occasions in which
it is clearly permissible, for example when a person has a pair of organs, only
one of which is really necessary. One can be removed to transplant to another
person, such as a kidney transplant. There are other cases in which it is
permissible, for example when the organ can be taken when the person is clearly
already deceased, such as eye corneal transplants.
However, it is manifestly immoral
to kill a person to take one of their organs, although that person would have
died on his own within a short period of time. It is never permissible to kill
one person just to help another. Only God has power over life and death.
The problem arises because once a
person has really died and his cardiac and respiratory functions have ceased for
several minutes, then his organs will be damaged in such a way that they cannot
be used for organ transplants. Hence the organs must be removed first.
The big dispute presently concerns when
a person is alive or dead. This involves the concept of brain death. The medical
profession generally considers that when a person has been proven to be brain
dead, for example by a flat EEG or by the absence of respiration when the
respirator has been turned off, then he must be considered to be dead, despite
the fact that his cardiac and respiratory functions are being artificially
maintained. Consequently, it is permitted, so they say, to remove any or all
organs from a person who is still breathing and whose heart is still beating, so
long as they are proven to be brain dead. This has actually become big business,
and a "living corpse" like this is worth probably more than $80,000
for its internal organs.
This practice is not only
disgustingly inhuman. It is manifestly anti-God and immoral. Death is the moment
at which the soul leaves the body. This is known only to God, the creator of
life. While a person is still breathing, even artificially, and while his heart
is still beating, he has many signs of life. His body is being maintained in
life by the circulation of blood. He is still a human being. It is true that if
his brain is dead he will never think again, and he will not have the reflexes
and reactions that depend upon brain function. However, this does not mean that
he is not alive. It just means that there is a permanent irreparable impairment
to his human activities. It is not for man to decide that he is not a man and
that he is not alive. Consequently, he must be treated as a living person. Hence
no essential organs can be removed until well after all respiration and cardiac
action have ceased. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]
|
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ECONOMICAL |
Is usury a sin?
Usury is the
charging of interest for the use of money, as if it had some productive power of
its own. St. Thomas Aquinas asks himself this questions in the Summa
Theologica (IIa IIae Q.78, A.1) and answers categorically in the
affirmative. His reason is that money is not something which remains after it is
used (e.g., a house, the use of which is charged for when it is rented
out), but which is consumed as it is used (e.g., food, the use of which
is not charged for, but just its sale value). These are his exact words:
He commits an
injustice who sells wine or wheat and who asks for double payment, i.e., one,
the return of the thing in equal measure, the other the price of the use,
which is called usury.... Now money, according to the Philosopher [i.e.,
Aristotle], was invented chiefly for the purpose of exchange; and consequently
the chief and principal purpose of money is its consumption or alienation
whereby it is sunk in exchange. Hence it is by its very nature unlawful
to take payment for the use of money lent, which payment is known as usury:
and just as a man is bound to restore other ill-gotten goods, so is he obliged
to restore the money which he has taken in usury.
There can be no
doubt that usury is what is driving modern capitalistic society along its
destructive path of materialism, and that it is responsible for world-wide
depressions and wars. If, however, usury is always a grave sin, this does not
mean that there cannot be legitimate interest, provided that it is not charged
for the value of the money itself, for it is a pure means of exchange and has no
producing power on its own, as does man's labor, or real property. Fr. Walter
Farrell, O.P. sums this up quite well in A Companion to the Summa, Vol.
III p.239:
Wherever usury is found it is
wrong; and its evil is manifest. It is absurdly simple to understand that to
charge a man twice for the same thing is always unjust; yet that is precisely
what usury does, it sells the same thing twice. The trick is possible only
when the thing sold or loaned is consumed in its very first use, things like
wine or sandwiches, or money. When we demand, over and above the return of the
original sum of money loaned, an added amount for the use of the money, our
act is the same as selling a man a glass of wine and then charging him for the
privilege of drinking it. If we keep this simple statement of usury in mind,
it will not be difficult to understand the absolutely necessary distinction
between usury and legitimate interest. The latter is charged not for the mere
use of the money as in usury, but on some extrinsic title.
Extrinsic titles for legitimate
interest could include such things as the risk of losing one's money altogether,
the positive damage caused to the creditor by such outside factors as inflation,
or the human productivity which becomes possible if money is invested to
purchase stock in a business enterprise, thus producing dividends.
The early Fathers of
the Church protested against usury in the strongest terms and numerous
ecclesiastical decrees in the 12th and 13th centuries enforced its prohibition
under pain of of excommunication and denial of Catholic burial. There has been,
however, a relaxation of the Church's law on the subject, since the development
of Protestantism made it socially acceptable, and laissez-faire
Capitalism in the 19th century made it an inescapable reality of daily life.
This relaxation of Church law is expressed in the 1917 Code of Canon Law,
Canon 1543:
If a commodity which is
consumed by its first use be lent on the stipulation that it becomes the
property of the borrower, who is bound to return to the lender not the thing
itself, but its equivalent only, the lender may not receive any payment by
reason of the loan itself. In the giving or lending of such a commodity,
however, it is not in itself unlawful to make an arrangement for the recovery
of interest at the rate allowed by the civil law, unless that rate is clearly
excessive...
Fr. E. Cahill, S.J.
in The Framework of a Christian State, p.49, comments on and explains
this change in the Church's law:
One may without enquiry or
solicitude as to the existence or not of extrinsic titles (such as accidental
loss caused by the loan, the risk of not being repaid, etc.) receive interest
at the rate laid down by the civil law, provided that rate be not clearly
excessive. The reason for this change or apparent change in the Church's
attitude towards usury is that in modern times, owing to the capitalistic
organization of economic life, money has practically become a form of capital,
and the Church follows her traditional policy in regulating her attitude
towards it. As usual she temporarily adjusts her discipline as far as
possible to the needs of the age, even when these needs are the result of a
state of things of which she does not approve, and allows the faithful to act
in accordance with social customs sanctioned by existing civil law, provided
these customs are not manifestly immoral or unjust.
Such would not be
the case, however, in a society which recognized and embraced the Social
Kingship of Christ. [Answered by Fr.
Peter R. Scott]
|
Should a traditional Catholic
plan his or her retirement?
The only true retirement is that
of the eternal happiness of heaven, where the soul has the leisure to enjoy the
goodness and holiness of the Most Holy Trinity, without any distraction or
interruption at all. This is the retirement that a Catholic has to plan for, by
his faithful accomplishment of the commandments of God, the precepts of the
Church, the duties of his state, especially towards his family, by his fidelity
to the true Mass, by the frequent reception of the sacraments, and his daily
prayers, meditations, spiritual reading and rosaries.
However, retirement from the
active workforce is also something that has to be planned. If not all of us will
experience this privileged time, and many of us will be taken beforehand, it
nevertheless has the potential of being the most serious, most profound, most
contemplative, most God-centered period of one’s life, as well as the most
helpful for others. It is that period of life that most directly prepares for
eternity. And yet for so many of the elderly, it is the emptiest and most
aimless and meaningless time, without other goal than the temporary joy of the
rapidly passing moments.
Plan then for a
retirement, not to be spent in continual vacation, but in doing all those things
that the necessities of work and family life previously made impossible. Try to
live close to a traditional priest, so that you can attend daily Mass and
devotions. Donate your time to charity, to teaching and helping out in schools,
to work around the church, or being of assistance to poor families or widows.
Stay close to your children, so that you can be of assistance in their own
difficulties in raising their own children. Be the extended family that they
need. Be the stabilizing influence, and the valuable asset that senior members
of the community ought to be. Live in the present, and your experience from the
past will be of value to the whole community. Use your leisure to teach true
moral values and detachment, and you will fight against the feverish
hyperactivity of our materialistic world. Use prudence in planning for the
retirement years, that you might have the means to support yourself, that you
might not be a burden on others. Yet at the same time remember that there is no
purpose in heaping up huge mounds of savings for some far off time that might
never come, for "Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth: where the
rust and moth consume, and where thieves break through and steal. But lay up to
yourselves treasures in heaven" (Mt. 6:19, 20). [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]
|
Can a Catholic in conscience
declare bankruptcy, and if so can he consider his debts as forgiven?
Civil laws allowing
the declaration of bankruptcy are just laws, enacted for the common good, for
they enable a debtor’s creditors to be satisfied in as far as and just a
manner as possible, and prevent his remaining assets from being squandered or
wasted. They consequently oblige in conscience, insofar as they do not conflict
with the natural law. Fr. Jone in his Moral Theology (p. 259) describes
what is allowed by natural law:
The natural law allows an
insolvent person to retain what is required to modestly support himself and
his family according to their social status and to establish a small
business…To retain more than this is an injustice and makes one subject to
restitution…
Consequently, it is morally licit
to declare bankruptcy, provided that it is truly impossible to pay one’s
creditors, and provided that one honestly declares all of one’s assets. However,
it does not necessarily follow from this that the debtor is freed from all
obligation in conscience to make restitution to his creditors.
In fact, ordinarily and of
itself, the obligation of restitution is not abolished but only temporarily
suspended, until such time as it becomes possible. The reason why this is
ordinarily the case is that the creditors only very reluctantly accept a partial
reimbursement of the debt, and cannot be considered as voluntarily condoning it,
if the former debtor enters into sufficient wealth to pay it off.
However, exceptions
to this ordinary rule of justice take place when civil laws explicitly and
entirely abolish every obligation of paying a debt after a true legal bankruptcy
declaration. This is an accepted exception, for such laws are just laws, very
useful for commerce and for the common good. Such persons, having honestly, and
without any fault of their own, fallen into bankruptcy, are then free to begin
again their family and business activities. Fr. Jone has this to say about the
United States:
Where the juridical opinion favors complete freedom in case of a
bona fide bankrupt. According to this more lenient viewpoint, debts are
contracted under the implied condition that they will cease in case of bona fide
bankruptcy. Although the legal immunity guaranteed in phrases as "forever
discharged from all debts and claims" does not apply to the internal forum,
nonetheless the law for all our States and territories "a discharge in
bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts…" is adduced
as proof of the solidly probably opinion that a declaration of bankruptcy
liquidates a bona fide bankrupt’s debts also in conscience (ibid,
pp. 259 – 260).
It seems to me that this opinion
can certainly be followed with respect to debts to mortgage companies, credit
card companies and the like, for they calculate on a certain proportion of bad
debts. However, it would seem that in the case of a personal loan from a friend,
acquaintance of relative the implied condition of the cessation of the debt in
case of bankruptcy would not exist, and that such debts call for restitution in
conscience, even if they do not according to civil law.
Furthermore, any
person who deliberately brings on a bankruptcy by negligence in administering
his finances, or by failure to regularly fail his bills, or by living beyond his
means, or by racking up high credit card debts, certainly has the duty in
conscience of restitution, even after bankruptcy has been declared. For it is
taught by all the theologians that when the bankruptcy is brought on by grave
fault or fraud on the part of the bankrupt, then the duty of restitution always
remains, as soon as it becomes possible to do so (Prummer, II, p. 210).
It is certain that in our
materialistic world this whole question of justice and honor in paying one’s
debts is taken very lightly, and that many people feel that they are in no way
culpable or at fault in bringing about their bankruptcy, or living in such a way
as to gravely risk bankruptcy, under the excuse that they can always declare
bankruptcy. This is a sin against justice, as well as an abuse of the bankruptcy
laws. This cardinal virtue of justice is crucial to any upright Catholic life.
Grounds of charity cannot be used to excuse from it. Traditional Catholics must
make an effort to escape from the slavery of materialism that will lead them to
sins against justice, by fighting against the mentality of spending all the
time, and of abusing the facility of credit cards. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]
|
Do you accept Belloc's
distinction between "productive" and
"non-productive" loans?
I have read and am aware of Belloc’s
theory that it is licit to charge interest on a loan provided that it is
productive, and that in this case it is not truly usurious.
In my opinion, a productive loan is
effectively the same thing as what is more traditionally called "extrinsic
title for legitimate interest." One of the extrinsic titles that I cited
(July 1998 The Angelus in "Q&A": cf. CATHOLIC FAQ above:
"Is
Usury A Sin") was human productivity. Clearly, if the money is used to
help man to produce something by his work, the person who provides the funds can
share (to a moderate extent) in the productivity of the work. However, it is not
the money itself which is productive. That is why the payment of dividends is
perfectly moral, but the question of interest is much more delicate. I must
confess that I prefer not to give a blanket approval to all "productive
loans," as does Hilaire Belloc. I believe that it is very easy to go from
that concept to that of modern day investment, and consequently just to consider
as usurious that which is speculative investment. This is not the position of
St. Thomas Aquinas and of Catholic Tradition. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]
|
Is it wise to give children
pocket money?
A judgment of prudence consists
in taking the right means to attain one’s goal. Pocket money must be given for a
reason, and that reason is certainly not to placate children, or so that they
can be like their friends, or have everything that they want. The reason why
children would be given pocket money would be to teach them a sense of
responsibility in the use of the means placed at their disposal in the best way
possible. It is important for a parent to realize that it is not because he has
given his child pocket money that he is free from all responsibility as to how
it is spent. The parent should not only know, but also supervise, the spending
of this money, and make it quite clear that he has the authority to forbid,
unnecessary, wasteful or worldly use of pocket money.
It is also important for children
to learn from an early age that privileges such as pocket money need to be
earned, and that it will be suppressed for behavior problems. It is also a
necessary education to give it as a payment for on time, joyful and good
performance of chores, so that pocket money is not something to be taken for
granted.
The age at which pocket money
is given and the sums given are highly variable, depending upon culture, the
family’s economic status and life style and the parents’ methods of
education. It is doubtless preferable to err on the side of austerity and
poverty, as is usually the case with large families. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]
|
Does the Church consider it a
sin to be rich?
Most assuredly not. The Church
has never condemned wealth nor riches in themselves much less the owners of vast
fortunes. Riches are not incompatible with true poverty of spirit. The latter
virtue may well flourish in one who is extremely rich and ought to be cultivated
by all. With great wealth comes an equally great obligation in charity.
Detachment from possessions will ensure that wealth is not an obstacle to
Christian charity but a source of generosity.
The wealthy man’s
possessions are not for himself alone, an exclusive preserve of selfish
enjoyment, but for those who have a claim upon his charity. The Church has
prospered greatly and rightly by the generous endowment of the rich. They give
to God and His Church, and in so doing advance the Gospel and the corporal and
spiritual works of mercy, thereby atoning for their own sins and reducing the
temporal punishment due to them. [Article
by Fr. Leo Boyle]
|
Must we always give to those
who ask for money, in particular beggars?
We are obliged in charity to
give of our surplus to the genuinely needy, and in some cases to deprive
ourselves provided our primary obligations have been met, and we don’t renege
on our particular duties of state, especially those that apply to family and our
local church. Prudence dictates that we don’t give money to drunks or drug
addicts, etc. One must also beware of the con artist, and the sob story which is
patently untrue. This knowledge comes with experience. Not everyone who asks
deserves to receive. There must be a practical, down-to-earth approach and even
limitation to giving. Almsgiving is a particularly Christian practice, but
remember, all charity begins at home.
Only charitable institutions
which respect the law of God and do nothing contrary to it should be supported,
in particular religious works of truly traditional Catholic nature. [Article by Fr. Leo Boyle]
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MISCELLANEOUS
|
Is slavery evil, and if so, surely the North
was right in the American Civil War?
Slavery as an institution can be understood in
two ways. The ancient pagans understood it as the right of
ownership of one person over another, as over a thing or an
animal, the slave entirely belonging in every aspect to his
master, without any recognition of his free will. This is illicit
and immoral, for one person can never have the right of control
over another’s intellect and will, according to which he is made
in the image and likeness of God. Such a pagan concept of slavery
is manifestly opposed to the natural law, and a violation of every
man’s duty to use his own intellect and will to freely serve God.
However, slavery need not be understood in this
sense. It can be simply the ownership of a man’s ability to work,
his abilities, his productivity. Understood in this sense, it does
not violate a man’s free will, nor his duty to love and serve God,
and is consequently not opposed to the natural law.
Furthermore, slavery is not opposed to
the divine positive law, i.e., to the law promulgated by
God Himself. We consequently find it in this sense allowed in the
Old Law for the Jews. Slavery is also mentioned several times in
the New Testament as something licit, slaves not being encouraged
to revolt, but to maintain their faithful service, for example by
St. Peter: "Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear,
not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward" (I
Pet. 2:18). St. Paul says the same: "Servants, be obedient to
them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear and
trembling, in the simplicity of your heart, as to Christ"
(Eph. 6:5). Also Col. 3:22. Likewise, masters are not told to free
their slaves, but to treat them well: "Masters, do to your
servants that which is just and equal: knowing that you also have
a master in heaven" (Col. 4:1). Also Eph. 6:9. Consequently,
it cannot be said that God forbids slavery in itself.
The fact that slavery is not in itself
intrinsically wrong can also be established from the fact that it
is licit for one man or for society to have power over a man’s
services or his acts. If a man can hire his labor out for a time,
he can hire it out for life, as was the case of the serfs in
Christendom. Likewise, if society has authority over a man to
impose imprisonment or capital punishment for crimes, then it has
the authority to impose a lesser sentence, such as the ownership
of a man’s services.
This being said, it is manifestly
obvious that the rise of the Catholic Church little by little put
an end to this institution, which it has many times condemned. The
problem with slavery is that it is so open to abuse, the slaves
having no protection against the infringing of their interior,
personal freedom, nor having any guarantee of being treated with
kindness, of being supplied with all the necessities of life, of
not being overworked, and of respect for their person.
These abuses became horrifically
apparent in the slave trade for the New World. Slave-hunting,
selling of children into slavery, inhumane treatment in the
transports and by slave traders, and some slave owners are but
some of these immoral conditions. It is for this reason that the
popes again and again condemned this slave trade, starting with
Pius II in 1462, including Paul III (1537), Urban VIII (1639),
Benedict XIV (1741), Gregory XVI (1839) and Leo XIII (1888).
Gregory XVI had this to say:
The Roman Pontiffs our predecessors
of glorious memory have not at all failed to many times
seriously reprehend slavery, as is their duty, as being harmful
to their (the black peoples’) spiritual salvation and bringing
opprobrium to the Christian name …whence we admonish and order by
our Apostolic authority all the faithful of every condition …not
to reduce into slavery …or exercise this inhuman trade. (Dec. 3,
1839)
Leo XIII was even more explicit in his
letter In Plurimis on May 5, 1888, to congratulate the
bishops of Brazil on the emancipation of slaves in Brazil on the
occasion of the 50th anniversary of his priestly ordination:
This decision was
particularly consoling and agreeable to us because we received
the confirmation of this news, so dear to us, that the
Brazilians desire henceforth to abolish and completely extirpate
the barbaric practice of slavery.… For in the midst of so much
misery, we must particularly deplore that misery of slavery, to
which a considerable part of the human family has been subject
for many centuries, thus groaning under the sorrow of abjection,
contrary to what God and nature first established…. This inhuman
and iniquitous doctrine that slaves must, as instruments lacking
reason and understanding, serve the will of their masters in all
things, is supremely detestable —so much, indeed, that once it
has been accepted there is no oppression, no matter how
disgusting or barbarous, that cannot be maintained uncontested
with a certain appearance of legality and law.
Consequently, there
can be no doubt that the importing of slaves from Africa to the
New World, so frequently condemned by the Church, as actually
practiced was evil. This does not, however, mean that the Church
condemned every slave owner. There were certainly Catholic slave
owners, who took real care of their slaves, supported their
families, provided for all their needs, gave them every facility
to become Catholic and save their souls, and who consequently
committed no sin, but rather acts of virtue. In practice, however,
the multitude of evils and abuses far outweighed the good.
This being said, Catholic historians
who have studied the Civil War point out that the real question
was not one of slavery at all, but one of economic control. It was
the capitalists of the North, with their factories, mines, means
of production, forcing an industrial and economic revolution on
the agrarian South. The Northerners had long had slaves of their
own. However, the Industrial Revolution produced a new kind of
slavery, that of the factory workers, who would sweat very long
hours for little income, for the profit of their capitalist
masters.
The struggles for
the rights of workers demonstrate that despite their technical
freedom, they were just as oppressed as the slaves of old, and
very often more so, for the slaves at least were provided with all
the necessities of life. The question of slavery is consequently
of little importance in the discussion of right and wrong in the
Civil War. It really is a question of economic revolution. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]
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How does one determine what buying and
selling is permitted on Sundays?
The traditional Code of Canon Law (1917)
is very explicit on this question, stating that, "On feast days
of obligation [including every Sunday] …one must abstain
from public commerce, public gatherings of buyers and sellers
(e.g., auctions) and all other public buying and
selling, unless legitimate custom or special indults permit them"
(canon 1248). The 1983 Code of Canon Law does not give this
precision, but simply states that those things are to be abstained
from that impede worship to God, joy proper to Sunday and due
relaxation (canon 1247). Everything is left to the interpretation
of the private individual.
The traditional law is very explicit, and
excludes all public buying and selling, such as auctions or major
legal contracts. However, it allows for the details to be
determined somewhat by local custom. This is not to be understood
as what everybody does, but the custom amongst fervent, practicing
Catholics. It is certain that private contracts can be entered
into, namely those that do not have any public legal form. It is
equally certain that the purchasing and selling of small items is
licit, such as milk, fruit, bread, flowers, holy pictures, books,
clothing and other such items that might be available at road side
stalls or at a church bookstall. All agree that those items that
are necessary for daily use, such as common food items, can be
sold and purchased on Sundays.
The authors also agree that if there is a grave
reason to purchase larger items on a Sunday, that this is
permissible, for example when a person lives a long distance from
town, and is only able to come in to town on a Sunday. These
exceptions, due to necessity, show the Church’s attachment to the
spirit of the law, rather than simply the letter.
There are things that are manifestly forbidden
in the traditional law of the Church, such as buying and selling
real estate, bidding on important items at auctions (e.g.,
furniture). Then there are areas that are not so clear cut, such
as doing one’s grocery shopping on a Sunday. Any one or other of
the items could certainly be purchased on a Sunday without any
scruple of conscience, and likewise a person who had no other
opportunity to do his grocery shopping could do so. However, a
person who did a whole week’s grocery shopping on a Sunday without
necessity would be considered as involved in public purchasing and
selling of items of large value, and could not be excused from at
least venial sin.
Here, as always, the value of the Church’s law
lies in the fact that it determines the right means to our end.
Our end is to sanctify the Holy Days and Sundays, for the greater
honor and glory of God and the salvation of our souls, which is
only possible if we remove the preoccupation with the mundane,
temporal things that occupy the rest of our time. We must
consequently consider it a grave spiritual obligation to take
these means that the Church so wisely imposes upon us. Let us then
be determined to abstain from all unnecessary shopping for items
of considerable value on Sundays and Holy Days. In particular let
us protest the opening of grocery outlets on Sundays by refusing
to patronize them on Sundays. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott] |
Is it a sin to drink soft drinks?
Every man is bound to love himself, and this
both with respect to his body and to his soul, and both with a
natural love and with a supernatural love, that we call charity.
The natural love is written into the natural
law, that makes a man long for the preservation of bodily life and
happiness. As St. Thomas Aquinas points out (ST, IIa IIae,
Q. 25, A. 4) this is the basis and root of all natural friendship,
according to which we love our friends as ourselves.
Supernatural charity is the love that we bear
towards ourselves on account of God, as God’s possessions, ordered
to His greater honor and glory. This supernatural love concerns
primarily the soul, for it alone is capable of God and of eternal
beatitude. However, it does concern secondarily the body, not in
itself, but inasmuch as it is an instrument of the soul, temple of
the Holy Ghost, destined to one day participate in the glory of
the soul.
Consequently, it would be perverse and opposed
to the natural order for a man to hate his own body and attempt to
harm it. It would also be opposed to supernatural charity to do so
(provided that it is a hatred of the body itself, and not just a
hatred of disordered self-love, or out of a motive of penance or
mortification), for it is our duty to love ourselves for the love
of God, and to love our body inasmuch as it is instrument of our
soul, nor to harm it in any way.
Consequently, it is a sin to knowingly consume
products that are certainly or probably harmful to the body,
especially if this is done for no reason at all, but simply to
satisfy sense pleasure.
Some people claim that soft drinks are harmful
to the body, on account of the high concentrations of caffeine,
aspartame and sugar. However, they are not harmful to everybody,
and there is no likelihood that soft drinks are going to harm a
person on a particular occasion. This is not likely to happen
except where there is gross over-consumption. Consequently, there
is no sin in drinking soft drinks. This is especially the case
since there is in general a very good reason why they are drunk
—to quench thirst, to refresh the body, to lift up one’s energy
level. They are consequently not drunk out of pure pleasure, but
for a reason. This being said, soft drinks are not necessary to
the body, and frequently consumed excessively out of disordered
desire. Consequently, it is very appropriate to practice the
spirit of mortification in their consumption, so as to drink
smaller quantities, and not too frequently, or just drink water.
[Answered by Fr. Peter Scott] |
Is it permissible to
embark on a hunger strike determined to fast until death, if one’s
non-violent political action is not successful?
The essential question to be resolved here is
whether embarking on a hunger strike is to commit suicide or not.
Suicide is defined as "the direct killing of oneself on one’s
own authority" (Fagothey, Right and Reason, p.
276).
Suicide is to be distinguished from indirect
killing which is only indirectly voluntary, for death is not
intended either as an end or as a means to an end, but is only
permitted as an unavoidable consequence. Such is the case of
deliberate exposure of one’s life to serious danger of death. This
is certainly permissible but only on condition that the usual
rules of the indirect voluntary or double effect apply, namely
that the bad effect of death is quite distinct from the good
effect that is desired, that the good effect does not come from
the bad effect, and that there is a proportionate reason to
justify the bad effect that is permitted as an unavoidable
consequence. Thus, it is permitted to place one’s life in danger
in time of war in order to defend one’s country, even knowing that
there is a good chance that one may be killed. However, it is
never permitted to directly kill oneself, even for one’s country,
for it is the evil effect of killing oneself which is desired in
itself, and the good effect comes from it. This is always wrong,
for the ends do not justify the means. Thus suicide bombers
certainly commit immoral acts when they kill themselves in order
to kill others. They cannot be said to act in virtue of the
principle of double effect.
The gravity of the sin of suicide lies in the
fact that it is a directly voluntary act in which it is one’s own
death that is intended either as an end or as a means to an end.
Such an act is directly contrary to the natural law, known to all
men by their very nature, for by nature we are God’s, and He has
exclusive dominion over us. It is in the natural law that man, who
is subject to God and dependent upon Him for everything, does not
have direct or absolute control over himself but only stewardship.
For there is no other way for man to attain his end than by
belonging to Almighty God, which a man refuses to do by
attributing to himself God’s right over life and death.
A hunger strike is direct suicide. It is death
itself that is desired in order to obtain a political change. It
is a direct killing of oneself, which is always wrong, regardless
of the good that one hopes to attain thereby. It is, consequently,
always a mortal sin regardless of the political gain that could be
expected. The only exception to this would be if a person had a
revelation from God indicating that it is God’s will for him to
kill himself so that it would be an act of obedience and
submission to the Author of life rather than an act of rebellion.
A person who thought he had such a revelation could possibly be in
good faith. However, if he were sane, he would still have to be
refused Catholic burial, on account of the scandal caused.
Furthermore, it is not reasonable to believe that God would ever
give such a command so directly opposed to the natural law upon
which grace and divine Revelation build. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott] |
Can the use of nuclear weapons in
time of war ever be justified?
The traditional principles of
Catholic morality manifestly forbid all use of nuclear weapons in time of war.
The reason for this is that, as all the authors say, the slaying of the innocent
is an illicit and immoral act, that cannot be justified for the winning of a
war. Noncombatants, who do not contribute either directly or indirectly to the
success of the enemy’s war effort, must be considered as innocent. To directly
attack them for any reason at all, such as to destroy a nation’s morale, is an
immoral act. It is understood that the killing of the innocent can often happen
as a by product of war, not directly willed in itself. This is not immoral, for
as long as it is not desired but simply an unavoidable side-effect of an
aggressive offensive or of a bombing of military targets.
However, nuclear weapons cause
mass destruction of entire civilian populations, nor can they be used to attack
localized military targets. Hence the killing of innocent civilians and
non-combatants is not just an unavoidable side-effect. It is what is directly
willed. This is manifestly immoral, no matter how just the war might be.
This response must, nevertheless, be modified by the
changing nature of war in the modern world. A new barbarism has emerged, which
goes by the name of total war. Starting with the American War Between the
States, and becoming increasingly intense ever since, modern wars are not a
conflict simply between the combatants of both sides. The whole resources of a
people are now committed to the war effort and to the total destruction of the
enemy, including industry, education, and all the infrastructure of a society.
This is manifestly an immoral concept of war, and cannot possibly be used to
justify the killing of the innocent, of non-combatants.
The difficulty arises when an enemy nation employs the
techniques of total war. It might happen that the only way to defend oneself
against an unjust aggressor in such an immoral war would be to oppose like force
to like force, mobilizing all of a country’s resources and attacking the enemy’s
civil targets. (cf. Fagothey, Right and Reason, p.572). The
justification for such a response would be that there are no such things as
non-combatants, and that since the entire population is involved in the enemy’s
war effort, all can be the target of aggressive defense. Although this might be
admitted as a theoretical possibility, it would certainly be an absolutely
frightening decision to have to take.
Hence, the situation could be
imagined in which the death of a large number of civilians through the use of
nuclear weapons could be justified through the principle of double effect, as a
necessary means to win a just war. However, even in such circumstances there
would have to be a proportionate reason for the evil of the death of the
innocent, namely the good intended. It is my contention that, in the modern
world, such a proportionate reason could never be imagined. The use of one
nuclear weapon would bring about the release of other nuclear weapons by the
enemy or their allies, and a cycle of unbelievable destruction would be created,
which would be a much greater evil than even losing a just war.
Consequently, it seems to me that
even allowing the possibility of the theory of total war having to be replied to
with total war, in practice the use of nuclear weapons is never permissible.
It is manifestly obvious that the
1945 use of atomic weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki was immoral. At that
time there was no threat to civilian populations in the allied countries, nor
could there truly have been said to be total war. There certainly was no
proportionate reason for the civilian suffering, destruction and misery that
resulted, not to mention the public scandal and horror that a "civilized" nation
would perpetrate such a barbaric act against the innocent. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]
|
How should a traditional Catholic plan for retirement?
Two excesses are to be avoided on
this question. There are those who cannot bring themselves to retire. They live
to work, have become attached to their own endeavors, and do not appreciate the
value of well-earned leisure in old age. More frequent is the attitude that
equates retirement with sloth, as if retired persons no longer have any duties
or responsibilities.
The truth is that retirement is a
special time of life, when a person can escape some from the incessant demands
of the rat race and concentrate on higher goals that would be impossible without
the extra leisure of retirement. It gives a person the opportunity to think of
his soul, to pray and meditate more regularly, to attend extra Masses and
devotions and to prepare his souls for its last end. However, it is also a time
when a person can devote more time and energy to the practice of the spiritual
and corporal works of mercy, whether they be directed towards one’s family
members (children or grandchildren) or whether they be directed towards others.
Thus retirement has a real purpose, in total opposition to the modern concept of
retirement as a well-earned right to unlimited sloth, pleasure and
self-indulgence for as long as one’s health holds out, as practiced by
snowbirds, winter Floridians and Texans.
Decisions concerning planning for
retirement will depend upon the understanding of this purpose. It is certainly
true that it is prudent to provide a nest egg for medical and other expenses,
and to arrange a good pension fund. It would be imprudent not to provide for old
age in such a way. However, it would be just as wrong for this to become a
fetish, a preoccupation.
On the one hand, retired persons should desire to locate
themselves close to a traditional chapel so that they can have ready access to
the Mass and sacraments, even during the week, and so that the priest can easily
get to them if they are sick. On the other hand, they need to play an essential
role in society, by the help that they give to their children and grandchildren,
to the community at large and to other traditional Catholics in particular. In
the present crisis, these two aspects of retirement can sometimes be in
conflict, and it can be difficult to resolve this conflict, and to decide
whether to relocate or not. In such cases no general rule can be given, since
the decision of prudence will differ in each particular case, according to the
circumstances. However, if a retired couple does plan to relocate, they should
have a plan as to how they will help those in need, whether family, parishioners
or others. To opt out of such duties of charity would be to opt out of the
responsibility and care for the common good that ought to be particularly
developed in older, retired persons. [Answered by
Fr. Peter R. Scott]
|
Could a US attack on Iraq be
considered a just war?
This question is sometimes
simplified to the question of whether we condone or condemn the actions of
Saddam Hussein. However, this is not the essential question here, even if the
legitimacy of his authority were to be questioned.
The morality and conditions for a just war were very well
explained by Fr. Iscara in his
erudite article in the July 2002 issue of The
Angelus (pp.2-16), inspiring himself from St. Thomas Aquinas (ST, IIa IIae, Q. 40, A.1). He there points out that the application
of these principles to determine the morality of a particular conflict can be
very difficult, given the complexity of actual situations (p.11).
The first condition for a war to be just is that it
is declared by a lawful or legitimate authority. It is certainly true that the
US Congress has the authority to declare a war for the self-defense of United States
territory or citizens. It is also certain that its concern for the common good
of the United States also means that it must have some concern for the common good of the
globe as a whole, given the mutual interdependence of nations. However, it does
not at all have the authority to act as an international policeman, for the
international common good is not its responsibility. For it to do so would be to
attack the sovereignty of other nations. No nation has the right to declare war
on another nation that is not a threat to it. Furthermore, a body of nations
cannot have the authority to make such a declaration of war, since it has no
sovereignty. It is true, however, that the people can rebel against an unjust
ruler who has lost his right to rule, and appeal for foreign aid. This does not
appear to be the case in Iraq, with the exception of exiled liberal dissidents.
The United States would have the moral right to declare war on Iraq only if Iraq posed a
real threat to United States security (or to that of United States allies). This has not at all been
demonstrated. The existence of weapons of mass destruction or Iraq’s ability to
use them has not been demonstrated, nor has the use of Iraq as a base for
terrorism.
The second condition for a just war is that there
must be a just cause, such as defense against an unjust attack or recuperation
of what has been unjustly taken. A presumed, imaginary, or even possible problem
of terrorist bases or the existence of weapons of mass destruction could not
constitute a just cause. Another aspect of the just cause is that it must be
proportionate to the evil, death, destruction, and human suffering that could be
caused by the war. Since modern wars are indiscriminate and attack civilians
just as much as military personnel, it cannot be conceived that a war of this
kind could be successful without a great deal of suffering for the citizens of
Iraq. There is a manifest lack of proportionality here that makes any reasonable
person wonder what the real, underlying reason for such a proposed war or
invasion could be. If it were, for example, United States self-interest by guaranteeing the
supply of oil, then it would be manifestly unjust. Here it is also to be
mentioned that a war is only just if there is a good chance of a rapid,
successful victory with a minimum of casualties. The specter of Vietnam makes
one wonder if this really is the case.
The third condition described by St. Thomas for a
just war is a right intention, and this in the objective domain, namely that it
be truly the re-establishment of justice which is aimed at. However, this is not
at all the case. Iraq has done no injustice to the United States. The absence of a right
intention is also manifest by the fact the United States is not insisting that Israel live
up to UN demands as it is with Iraq. To the contrary, the embargo against Iraq
has caused the death of many children, estimated by some as many as one million.
In this regard, a war can only be just if all other avenues of resolution have
been exhausted. This does not at all appear to be the case, which is why other
nations, that do not stand to gain as much, are not interested in participating.
Consequently, the proposed war on Iraq is not morally
licit. This does not mean, however, that American serviceman could not fight in
such a conflict, even if they were aware that it is not based on moral
principles. It is their duty to defend their country, and once a war were
declared it would be necessary for them to do so. It is rather strange that it
is the Arab country that has been most tolerant towards its relatively large Chaldean Christian minority which is being threatened in this way. One hopes
that it will not be a repeat of Kosovo, in which the NATO invasion brought as a
consequence the destruction of over 100 monasteries and churches, most of which
had survived 500 years of Moslem rule. [Answered by
Fr. Peter R. Scott]
|
Should I refuse to speak to my
daughter, who is living in sin with her boyfriend?
Certainly it is your duty to avoid anything that would give the impression of
supporting or helping her to commit this sin, whether you do it materially or
emotionally, directly or indirectly. Any such encouragement is certainly matter
for confession. It is furthermore your grave duty to inform her that she knows
that you abhor such behavior, so offensive to God and scandalous to other souls,
including siblings. You cannot allow the two of them to come to family
gatherings, as if they were married. This would be to approve the scandalous
situation. Alas, this is frequently not enough to force them to separate.
However, I am concerned that the approach of cutting off all conversation and
contact until she ceases living in sin is not psychological and will not be the
right approach to touch her soul. The best that could come from it would be that
it would force her to get married. The worst is that it could turn her away from
our holy religion. However, neither of these is what you desire. I have seen
many situations like this. The young people involved are always blinded by
passion and short sighted. They ought not to be forced or coerced into marriage.
It does not work to approach the matter head-on and in a frontal manner. Such an
approach is often counter-productive. It makes the sinner feel personally
attacked and threatened.
My approach to this situation would be quite different. Firstly, I believe
that it is very important that you maintain contact, and that you speak
frequently to your daughter, and express your concern and affection for her.
Secondly, there is no point belaboring the point of her sin, and pushing her
further into her obstinacy, or of getting married without due preparation.
Thirdly, you must take a positive tack. Speak about your own spiritual life, the
graces that you receive and how God has taught you to carry your cross.
Speak about love, and how the roses and thorns are inseparable in your own
marriage. Encourage her positively in the practice of virtue. Remember that all
virtues are connected together, and by encouraging her to practice charity,
meekness, humility, thoughtfulness, etc., you are effectively encouraging her to
practice chastity without saying so. Encourage her especially in her daily
prayers. Talk about spiritual reading, and give her the very correct impression
that she also can pray, even though she is not in the state of grace. Encourage
her to recite her Rosary every day, or the Litany of the Blessed Virgin Mary to
know the will of God (but be very careful not to tell her what the will of God
is, she has to figure this out for herself). Speak to her about Mass, and the
spiritual high points in the year, and you can expect that when she starts
reciting her Rosary every day, she will go to Mass.
All of these things will have a much more profound effect upon her soul than
any reproach or harsh words. If you can get her to pray, you will not have to
say anything about the horror and scandal of living in sin. She will see it for
herself. This must be your goal. I have often given instructions to a couple
living in sin (e.g., one would like to convert). I do not wait until they
separate to start the classes. I simply teach them the catechism. If they follow
through with their prayers, it does not take more than three months for them to
ask what they need to do about their living situation. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]
|
Is a marriage valid if a couple
agrees beforehand to limit the number of children by artificial birth control or
Natural Family Planning?
The Church’s teaching is summarized in
canon 1013 of the 1917 Code of Canon Law, which states that "the primary end of marriage
is the procreation and education of children." The intention of having
children, provided that this is possible, is consequently essential to the very
substance of the matrimonial contract, which is for "acts which are in
themselves capable of engendering children" (cf. canon 1081,
1917 Code of Canon Law).
The importance of children as the
primary end of marriage was again stressed by the Holy Office under Pope Pius
XII:
To the question: "Whether the views of certain recent
writers can be admitted, who either deny that the primary end of marriage is the
procreation and education of children, or teach that the secondary ends are not
necessarily subordinate to the primary end, but are equally principal and
independent," the reply was: In the negative (quoted in Bouscaren &
Ellis, Canon Law, p.400).
Yet the 1983 Code of Canon Law embraces the
personalist conception condemned less than 40 years earlier by not only placing
the two ends of marriage on an equal and independent level, but even listing
first the secondary end (i.e., mutual support, or the personal good of
the spouses):
The matrimonial covenant, by
which a man and a woman establish between themselves a partnership of the
whole of life, is by its nature ordered towards the good of the spouses and
the procreation and education of offspring (canon 1055, §1, 1983 Code of Canon Law).
It is ultimately this new concept of marriage, as being
for the couple themselves, and not so much for children, which has resulted in
the refusal of Catholics since Vatican II to have large families. Artificial
birth control, which is the destruction of Catholic families, is no longer
condemned as a mortal sin, for marriage is now considered in a selfish way, as
being for the couple itself, rather than an outpouring of love desiring to
participate in God’s work of creation and sanctification of His children. The
so-called practice of Natural Family Planning (NFP), propagated in the post-Conciliar
Church as a "Catholic" method of contraception, derives also from the same
contraceptive mentality. Since marriage is considered primarily for the couple
itself, they consider themselves free to determine the number of children and
their spacing. This can be a mortal sin if NFP is employed without sufficient
reason, as approved by the Church (e.g., serious eugenic, social, or
medical reasons, such as danger to the life of the mother through additional
children). Whether it be through artificial or natural means that the first
purpose of marriage is frustrated, such couples who are not willing to accept
all the children God sends them do indeed fail to live up to their marriage
vows.
However, this does not mean the marriage vows with the
condition of limiting children by artificial contraception or natural family
planning are necessarily invalid. The exclusion of children is certainly a
grounds for a declaration of nullity, but only when there is an explicit,
provable, and positive act of the will to avoid children, that is, only when the
obligation of having children, as being the fulfillment of the first purpose of
marriage, is explicitly excluded. For this is an intention contrary to the
substance of marriage itself. The difficulty in such cases is to determine
whether it is the obligation of having children which is refused, or whether it
is simply the fulfillment of this obligation (cf. Bouscaren, Canon Law
Digest, I, pp. 532,533).
Those couples who accept the obligation of having children
are certainly validly married, even if they do not always fulfill this
obligation, e.g., by limiting the number of their children. This is the
case of those selfish couples, without faith in Divine Providence, who are
determined to limit the size of their family for reasons of convenience or
simply because they prefer it that way. They commit a grave sin, even if it is
by NFP that they presume to do this. They are truly married, but they will never
be able to communicate to their children generosity, the spirit of sacrifice,
the love of the Cross, of souls and the Church.
Moreover, even if a couple deliberately excludes all
children, the Church always presumes, until proven otherwise, that it is the
fulfillment of the duty that is excluded, and not the obligation of having
children itself, and that consequently the marriage is valid. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]
|
Is it a mortal sin to refuse
one’s husband or wife the marital debt?
Conjugal relations
are rightly called the "marriage debt", which each spouse owes
the other in justice the relations that are apt to engender children. It is this
very particular right over one’s body that is given up to one’s spouse by
marriage vows. Saint Paul is very explicit about this:
Let the
husband render the debt to his wife, and the wife also in like manner to the
husband. The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband. And in like
manner the husband also hath not power of his own body, but the wife. (I Cor. 7:3 & 4)
A debt in justice
obliges under pain when a serious matter or quantity is owed. However, marriage
relationships are a serious matter and of great importance. Furthermore, the
refusal of the marriage debt may cause a danger of incontinence. Consequently,
it is a mortal sin to deprive one’s spouse of these relationships. The typical
example of this is when a wife feels that she is justified in withholding the
marriage debt because her feelings are hurt, or she is not appreciated enough.
However, there is no excuse for the husband to withhold the affection and care
for his wife’s feelings, for is responsible for them as head of the family.
However, it is possible for the
couple to agree, by mutual consent, to abstain for a short period of time, for
example for penance, during Lent. However, it must be by mutual consent, and on
the understanding that either spouse can withdraw it at any time. Saint Paul
speaks of this also:
Defraud
not one another, except, perhaps, by consent, for a time, that you may give
yourselves to prayer (I Cor 7:5).
There can, however,
be good reasons that excuse a husband or wife from rendering this marriage debt,
such as adultery of the other spouse, or unreasonable demands (e.g.
frequency, intoxication) or grave danger to health or life (e.g. by the
possible communication of infectious diseases), or a husband who refuses to
perform his duty of supporting his family (Jone, Moral Theology, pp. 557
& 558). There can also be special circumstances that reduce the culpability
of refusing the marriage debt, so that it is only a venial sin, for example "if
the petitioner will readily renounce his right, or if rendering it is only
briefly postponed, or when the use of the marriage right is frequent and its
refusal is only rare" (ibid). [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]
|
Is one allowed to study on
Sunday?
The important distinction to be observed in the keeping of
the Sunday rest is between servile work, opera servilia and liberal
works, opera liberalia. Note that the Church’s interdiction does not
depend on the purpose, or reason for which the works are done, but on the nature
of the work itself. Servile works performed out of charity are forbidden on
Sundays, such a mowing a neighbor’s lawn or painting his garage, and liberal
works are permitted, even if they are done for profit, such as painting pictures
to sell.
You might wonder what the difference, then, is between
servile work and liberal works, and why it is that servile works should be
particularly forbidden. St. Thomas Aquinas explains in the Summa Theologica
(IIa IIae, Q. 122, A. 4, ad 3),
...servile work is so called from servitude; and
servitude is threefold. One whereby man is the servant of sin, according to Jn.
8:34 '"Whosever committeth sin is the servant of sin," and in this case
all sinful acts are servile. Another servitude is whereby one man serves
another. Now one man serves another not with his mind, but with his body.
Wherefore in this respect those works are called servile whereby one man
serves another. The third is the servitude of God; and in this way the work of
worship, which pertains to the service of God, may be called a servile work.
Clearly Sundays are consecrated to the worship of God, and
servile works in this third sense are not only permitted but obligatory. Also,
servile works in the first sense of sin are always forbidden, but especially on
Sunday, the day that is specially given to the greater glory of God. If servile
works in the second sense of physical activities formerly done by servants are
expressly forbidden on Sundays, it is because the preoccupation with such
matters is a part of the punishment for original sin (Gen 3:19: "In
the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread") and hinders the soul from
being elevated to the things of God, from contemplating eternity, and taking
care of its eternal salvation and the greater glory of God. Not so the liberal
arts, which express the soul’s elevation and consideration of beauty, truth
and goodness in varying ways. The Sunday should consequently be used for the
soul to express its freedom to know, love and serve God not only by
participating in Holy Mass and the Church’s offices, and also by its exercise
of and/or appreciation for the liberal arts. This is summarized by Jone:
Liberal and artistic works are also lawful: studying,
teaching, drawing, architectural designing, playing, music, writing (also
typing), painting, delicate sculpturing, embroidering, taking photographs.
These works are lawful even if done for remuneration (Moral Theology).
However, it may happen on occasion that even the liberal
arts hinder the soul’s worship of God, when they are immoral or an occasion of
sin, or if a person is so preoccupied with them that he no longer assists at
Mass or attends to his spiritual duties. In such circumstances, study also
becomes sinful on Sunday. [Answered by
Fr.
Peter R. Scott]
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Is it permissible for a traditional Catholic to teach in a public school?
It is permissible for a
traditional Catholic teacher to teach in a public school, but only provided that
he or she does not compromise his Catholic principles.
Nevertheless, a Catholic who
really loves his Faith would want to teach in a traditional Catholic
environment, where the knowledge that he imparts can be integrated into the
knowledge of God, religion and the Faith, and can be subordinated to the Divine
Wisdom that we learn from our Catholic Faith. He will also appreciate the moral
and disciplinary support that he finds in a Catholic school, and the harmony
that exists within the faculty, and between the direction and the students of
the school.
He will consequently not be deceived by the apparently greater good of being
a "lighthouse of truth in the stormy sea of indifferentism." A good
Catholic teacher, determined to live a serious and profound spiritual life, will
do much more good in a traditional Catholic school, in which he is backed up by
his Principal and fellow teachers, than in the secular environment of a public
school. For in the Catholic school, he can work to form an elite, which elite
once formed will continue on his own work for souls. However, in a secular
environment he is limited to simply touching souls, and is unlikely to bring
about a profound change in such souls, unless he can convince them to enter into
a traditional Catholic school.
This having been said, it is
certainly true that some teachers do not have the possibility of teaching in a
traditional Catholic school, or cannot live without the income and benefits that
the public school system provides. In such a case, it is permissible, provided
that there is no danger to their own Faith, and provided that he or she stands
up publicly for Catholic principles of Faith and morality. In this way, he or
she would not be seen to cooperate in any way with the evil and falsehood that
are propagated in public schools, nor to support the system without God that is
destroying our youth, and could certainly be a blessing to the isolated souls
that are seeking the truth. [Answered by
Fr. Peter R. Scott] |
I know that there is a Catholic
standard of modesty in dress for women. But is there also a standard of
dress for men?
Absolutely there is, for exactly
the same principles apply for men as for women.
Modesty is a moral virtue, and a part of
the virtue of temperance, by which a person brings moderation to his outward
and inward actions (inasmuch as they can be reflected by certain exterior
signs), in order to keep them under the control of right reason (ST, IIa IIae Q. 160, A. 2). St. Thomas Aquinas lists four kinds of
modesty in ordinary matters, that are obligatory for everybody:
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One
is the movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated
by humility.
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The second is the desire of things pertaining to
knowledge, and this is moderated by studiousness which is opposed to
curiosity.
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The third regards bodily movements and actions
(including words), which require to be done becomingly and honestly,
whether we act seriously or in play.
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The fourth regards outward show, for instance in dress
and the like. (ibid.)
If all four aspects of modesty
are equally important, there remains no doubt that the last two, which have no
special name, are most commonly understood by the term modesty. Moreover, it
is most especially the last that is referred to by modesty, on account of the
disorder of fallen human nature, which is most easily overcome by a disordered
attraction to the last kind of immodesty.
Clearly men have an equal duty
as women to avoid provocative words or actions and to avoid any kind of dress
that might show off their person or their body, leading to vanity. Like women,
they are hence forbidden to display their bodies in public in an unseemly
manner, or in a way that might produce a disordered attraction in the opposite
sex. Men should always wear a shirt for gymnastics, and shorts should not be
worn in public, but only be used for athletics, and should not be too brief or
too tight. Likewise, men should dress modestly for Sunday Mass, with shirt,
tie, jacket, trousers, all of which symbolize a man’s sense of responsibility,
leading his family by the orderly self-discipline of modest dress, and doing
his duty in the true worship of God.
However, there are two
important differences in the application of these principles to men, as
compared to women, and which are the reason why the Church’s documents on the
subject refer to modesty in women. The first is that the nature of a woman
makes her much more prone to the temptation of vanity, to show off her body,
and the nature of a man makes him much more tempted by seeing this.
Consequently, the gravest and most dangerous offenses against modesty,
understood in its fourth and most restricted meaning, namely as against
purity, are by women.
It is for this reason that the
Church has been so much more adamant about women’s dress, as in the following
quote from a decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Council of January 18,
1930:
His Holiness, Pius XI, has never ceased to inculcate in
word and writing that precept of St. Paul (I Tim 2:5, 10) —"Women also
in decent apparel; adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety …as it becometh
women professing godliness with good works."
And on many occasions the same Supreme Pontiff has
reproved and sharply condemned the immodesty in dress which today is
everywhere in vogue; even among women and girls who are Catholics; a
practice which does grave injury to the crowning virtue and glory of women,
and moreover unfortunately leads not merely to their temporal disadvantage,
but, what is worse, to their eternal ruin and that of other souls.
It is no wonder, then, that
bishops and other Ordinaries of places, as becomes ministers of Christ, have
in their respective diocese unanimously resisted in every way this
licentious and shameless fashion and in doing so have cheerfully and
courageously borne the derision and ridicule sometimes directed at them by
the ill-disposed….
There is a second reason why
modesty of dress is especially applicable to women over men. It is that there
is a special form of immodesty that is characteristic of our modern times, and
it is the immodesty of women wearing men’s clothes, most notably pants and
shorts. This undermines a woman’s psychological perception of herself, and
of her difference from a man, which in turn de-feminizes her, erodes natural
respect between men and women, removes the defense to over-familiarity, and
eventually degrades the relationships between men and women to the level of
sensuality. It is this form of immodesty which is ultimately by far the most
destructive of human relationships and of the virtue of purity.
If, therefore, there is
certainly a standard of modesty for men, it must always be remembered that the
battle for women’s modesty is both much more crucial and much more difficult
to win.
Real men will, however, teach
and lead by their example. If they have a difficult time insisting on the
modesty of their wife or daughters, they will remember to practice very
precisely all the four kinds of modesty mentioned above, and their admonitions will bear fruit.
[Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]
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Could you
indicate whether I can perform classic country acoustic guitar folk
music for income?
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It
is perfectly permissible to perform old time country folk music for income. It
is to be understood, however, that there can be no sensual or immoral themes
behind the lyrics used in the songs, and that the style remains that of folk
music, refusing the deformations of Jazz and Rock.
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It is
perfectly permissible to perform old time country folk music on TV, even on TV
run by a heretical organization.
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It is not
permissible to perform Gospel music, either on TV or in public. For this kind
of music is an expression of the false protestant religion, and is
consequently an active participation in the propagation of a false religion.
It is consequently not permissible to perform Gospel music in a nursing home.
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It is
perfectly permissible to adapt the medium of "Gospel" music, that is
the style, to Catholic use, and to write Catholic lyrics yourself, to go with
commonly known Gospel style tunes. The popular medium could then be used to
popularize and propagate the Catholic Faith. Under these conditions you could
sing publicly in a nursing home, or on Christian TV, even if the producers or
organizers were not aware of the fact that the music that you are singing,
actually expresses Catholicism and not Protestantism. To do so would be to
perform a good deed, for the salvation of souls.
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It is
perfectly licit, as a professional performer, to perform at secular
ceremonies, including secular marriage ceremonies, that is when there is
really no religious service, even if a minister of religion is present. It is
certainly permissible to perform at wedding receptions. It is not permissible
to actively participate in a Protestant religious ceremony by which a person
would marry. This distinction may sometimes be a little difficult to make.
I do hope that these few
remarks help you to decide what to do, and I pray that God will bless you and
enable you and your guitar to edify as well as to please. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]
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Does the Catholic Church
forbid cremation?
At no period in the history of Catholicism was the
practice of cremation ever adopted or favored in the Catholic Church. From the
very beginning, burial of the dead, i.e., inhumation, was an inviolable
practice in the Church and she struggled constantly against cremation, a pagan
custom often accompanied by rites incompatible with the Catholic Faith.
Under Boniface VIII whoever practiced cremation was
excommunicated and the remains even of the corpse were refused Christian burial.
With the advent of the French Revolution in 1789 an attempt was made on November
11, 1796 to introduce cremation; it met with no success. It was only as a result
of Masonic influence and pressure that in the final quarter of the 19th century
the idea of cremation became fashionable and certain governments gave it
official recognition. The campaign was begun in Italy and the first experiments
took place in 1872 by Brunetti in Padua, and in April 1873, the Italian Senate
gave approval, and, in Milan on January 22, 1876 the first cremations took
place. Later in Germany, France, Sweden, Norway and England the practice was
legalized.
The Church reacted strongly.
Cremation in itself is not intrinsically evil, nor is it repugnant to any
Catholic dogma, not even the resurrection of the body for even after cremation
God’s almighty Power is in no way impeded. No divine law exists which formally
forbids cremation. The practice is, however, in opposition to the
constant, unbroken tradition of the Church since its foundation.
Three decrees emanated from the
Holy Office:
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On May 19,
1886 in answer to two questions posed by the bishops, the Church forbade the
joining of cremation societies which were for the most part of Masonic origin
and spirit, and it was further condemned to request cremation of one’s own
body or the body of another.
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Some seven months later, December 15, 1886, Pope Leo XIII
ratified this document. Catholics who destined their bodies for cremation were
deprived of a proper Christian burial.
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On July 27, 1892, the matter was definitively resolved.
Priests were requested not to give such Catholics the last rites; no public
funeral Mass could be said.
However, in certain strict circumstances the Church
tacitly or even expressly authorizes cremation, e.g., in the case of an
epidemic where public health safety is in question.
Unfortunately, however, the document of Pope Paul VI, Piam
et constantem, of July 5, 1963, introduced a process of reversal of Church
practice. Where it is alleged there is no denial of Catholic doctrine nor
contempt for the body, nor hatred of the Faith, cremation is permitted. Hygienic
and economic reasons may play a part in this permission.
This paved the way for Canon 1176 of the
1983 Code of Canon Law, paragraph 3, in which cremation is permitted though burial is
earnestly recommended, but it is only the recommendation of a pious custom.
Funeral rites are forbidden for those who have chosen cremation for reason
contrary to the Christian Faith (canon 1184, §1.2º). It is also forbidden to
scatter the ashes or to have them in your home; they must be buried or placed in
a vault in a cemetery.
What should be our attitude, as
faithful Catholics, to this change of legislation? The liberalization of the law
forbidding cremation is without a doubt a concession to the ever increasing
influence of Freemasons and those who refuse the belief in the resurrection of
the body. We have now, more than ever before, the obligation of professing our
Faith in this important article of the Creed, for it is precisely by opposition
to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body that this custom has become
commonplace.
Consequently we must adhere to the constant tradition of
the Church, which numbers the burial of the dead as one of the corporal works of
mercy, so great must be our respect for the body, "the temple of the
Holy Ghost" (I Cor. 6:19). We should neither ask for cremation,
nor permit it for our relatives nor attend any religious services associated
with it. This is precisely what the traditional (1917) Code of Canon
Law prescribes:
If a person has in any way
ordered that his body be cremated, it is illicit to obey such instructions;
and if such a provision occur in a contract, last testament or in any
document whatsoever, it is to be disregarded. (canon 1203, §2).
It is likewise stated "those who give orders that
their body be cremated" are amongst those who "must be refused
ecclesiastical burial." (canon 1240, §1, 5º) [Article
by Fr. Leo Boyle]
SEE THE CATHOLIC
FAQ BELOW FOR MORE ON THIS SUBJECT |
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A priest told me
that cremation is acceptable as long as the body is at the funeral, and
that after the Requiem Mass the body can be cremated. Please advise.
It is false to affirm that cremation is acceptable
provided that the body is present at the funeral.
The traditional laws of the
Church are very explicit on this point. Those who have ordered their body to be
cremated are to be refused a Church burial, unless they have given some sign of
repentance (canon 1240, §1, 5). This means that they must be refused any kind of
Requiem Mass or public ceremony, even an anniversary Mass (canon 1241). The
reason for this strict rule lies in the fact that the Freemasons and enemies of
the Church who do not believe in the resurrection of the body have encouraged
this practice as a practical denial of respect due to the body as the temple of
the Holy Ghost which will rise again on the last day. It is a pagan practice
which is abhorrent to the sacredness of the Catholic life.
It is true that this rule was relaxed as
early as 1963, during Vatican II. The 1983 Code of Canon Law reflects
this change by stating that Catholic burial is only to be refused to those
people who have chosen cremation for reasons opposed to the Christian Faith
(canon 1184, §1, 2). This ambiguous expression opened the door to cremation on
demand, with the subsequent lack of respect for the body, sealed with the Holy
Trinity in baptism.
However, the question is a moot question.
For the Conciliar Church has abandoned Requiem Masses altogether, and not just
for those who are to be cremated. Here lies the real tragedy, that the sacrifice
of the Mass is no longer being offered for the repose of the poor souls
suffering in Purgatory.
As far as true Catholics are
concerned, cremation is not an acceptable practice, except in extreme cases of
danger due to plague or other infectious disease. It must still be regarded as a
practical denial of Catholic dogma concerning the body as the temple of the Holy
Ghost and the resurrection of the body. Traditional priests must consequently
refuse Catholic burial services and the Requiem Mass to all those people who
have ordered that their bodies be cremated. Furthermore, traditional Catholics
have the duty to explain this to their relatives, so that they may not be in a
position of having to implement cremation or refuse the Requiem Mass. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]
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In your
answer in the January 1999 The Angelus (p. 25) you presented St.
Thomas as saying that all drunkenness is mortally sinful, regardless of
the extent, for the quantity of wine drunk is but a circumstance?
I think that the misunderstanding concerning the comparative gravity of
imperfect and perfect drunkenness lies around the use of the term
"objection." St. Thomas does not at all agree with the objection that
the quantity of wine drunk is but a circumstance. He simply presents this
objection, as always, in order to adequately answer it. His answer is that what
makes drunkenness a mortal sin is that it removes the use of reason. This means
that only perfect drunkenness is a mortal sin. Consumption of alcohol to a
lesser extent, or imperfect drunkenness, is consequently only a venial sin. It
is therefore false to say that the quantity of alcohol consumed is but a
circumstance.
Hence, the moderate consumption
of alcohol, without any excess or drunkenness, is not a sin at all. The
consumption of alcohol to excess, such that one becomes tipsy and loses some
physical self-control, but not the use of reason, is but a venial sin. The
knowing and willing consumption of alcohol to such an extent as to remove the
use of reason is a mortal sin.
St. Thomas consequently keeps the balance
between the imbibers and the teatotalers, as does St. Paul when speaking to
St.
Timothy. A little alcohol, without excess, is not at all offensive to God and
may be good for mind and body. A small excess of alcohol is certainly offensive
to God, but only a venial sin, and a voluntary large excess removes sanctifying
grace from the soul. [Answered by
Fr. Peter R. Scott]
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Is it permissible
to send our children to a Protestant grade or high school?
Pope Pius XI,
in his encyclical, Divini illius Magistri on Christian Education
(December 31, 1929), explains why Catholics cannot attend "neutral"
schools, from which religion is excluded, or "mixed" schools,
in which children of different religion are educated side by side:
From this it follows that the
so-called "neutral" or "lay" school, from which religion is excluded, is
contrary to the fundamental principles of education. Such a school moreover
cannot exist in practice; it is bound to become irreligious.... We renew
and confirm their declarations [Pius IX & Leo XIII] …in which the frequenting
of non-Catholic schools, whether neutral or mixed, those namely which are open
to Catholics and non-Catholics alike, is forbidden for Catholic children, and
can be at most tolerated, on the approval of the Ordinary alone, under
determined circumstances of place and time, and with special precautions.
Neither can Catholics admit that other type of mixed school…in which the
students are provided with separate religious instruction, but receive other
lessons in common with non-Catholic pupils from non-Catholic teachers (St.
Paul Editions, pp.42, 43).
The pope goes on to explain why it is that the fact of receiving some religious
instruction does not make a Catholic education, or a fit place for Catholic
students. He goes on to explain:
To be this it is necessary that all the teaching and the whole organization of
the school, and its teachers, syllabus and textbooks in every branch, be
regulated by the Christian spirit… (ibid).
The simple answer is
consequently that it is not permissible to send one’s children either to public
or to Protestant schools.
This is solidly backed up by the
1917 Code of Canon Law, which explains
that it is not sufficient that nothing be contrary to the Catholic religion and
morality, but that the principle function of education is the religious and
moral instruction that only the Catholic Church can give (canon 1372). However,
it is clearly apparent that protestant schools, no less than secular public
schools, teach a great deal which is contrary to the Catholic religion and
morality. In fact, it is even more perverse inasmuch as it is done in the name
of God, and of a false religion. That is why canon 1374 strictly forbids
Catholic children from attending all non-Catholic schools, except with the
permission of the Ordinary. Needless to say, there is no such forbidding in the
equivalent canon of the 1983 Code of Canon Law (canon 798).
An instruction of the Holy
Office of November 24, 1875 explains the kind of conditions under which the
Ordinary of a diocese might have granted permission to attend a non-Catholic
school:
It will usually be a
sufficient reason if there is either no Catholic school at all available, or
only one which is inadequate for the suitable education of the children
according to their condition. In that case, in order that the public school
may be attended with a safe conscience, the danger of perversion which is
already more or less connected with its very nature must, by appropriate
remedies and safeguards, be rendered remote (quoted in Bouscaren &
Ellis, Canon Law, pp.705-706).
Exceptions to this general rule can consequently only be granted if there is
such strong Faith in the home, such regular religious practice, such fidelity to
the reception of the sacraments, such a religious spirit in the family, that
there is no proximate danger for the Faith. Clearly in this present day and age,
the modernist Ordinary of the diocese cannot be contacted or trusted.
Consequently, a family must consult their traditional priest or pastor to give
an objective assessment as to whether the danger of perversion is truly only
remote, or whether it is proximate. Clearly, also, there must be strong reasons
to justify even the remote danger, such as no other possibility of education,
due to the absence of a true Catholic school and the impossibility of home
schooling in a particular family. Parents who are able to do so, but
deliberately refuse to make use of either of these two means of giving a
Catholic education to their children, cannot be excused from mortal sin, and
must be refused absolution, as is stated in the above-mentioned decree of the
Holy Office:
Parents …who,
although there is a suitable Catholic school properly equipped and ready in
the locality, or, although they have means of sending their children elsewhere
to receive a Catholic education, nevertheless without sufficient reason and
without the necessary safeguards to make the proximate danger remote send them
to the public schools —such parents, if they are contumacious, obviously
according to Catholic moral doctrine cannot be absolved in the Sacrament of
Penance (ibid, p.706).
Those who might claim that these
strict rules no longer apply are sadly misled. The present grave moral and
religious crisis in the world and in the Church makes youth more than ever
susceptible to the perversion of their minds by error and vice. Parents and all
those who have responsibility for children are obliged to protect them, and this
can only be done by Catholic schools and home schooling. Unfortunately, the
denial of the dogmas of our Faith has become so widespread in the modernist
Catholic school system, that these schools must be considered equivalent to
protestant schools. The Faith is in grave danger of perversion, and all the more
as the errors are being spread by those who are looked up to as having
authority; namely priests and religious.
There is consequently no
sacrifice too great for the Catholic education of your children, preferably in a
traditional Catholic school, but if not, at least by an effective, organized,
disciplined home school program. [Answered by Fr. Peter R. Scott]
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